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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Murray City Civil Service Commission (hereinafter 
"Commission") erred in excluding evidence of retaliatory motives, bias and intent of 
witnesses Lt. Pete Fondaco and Chief Kenneth Killian; 
2. Whether the Commission erred in finding that there was substantial 
evidence to support the charge that petitioner, Edward J. Lucas ("Officer Lucas"), had 
lied during an internal affairs investigation; 
3. Whether the Commission erred in finding that the termination of Officer 
Lucas' employment was consistent and proportionate with the alleged offense; 
4. Whether the Commission erred in preventing Officer Lucas's counsel 
from impeaching Martin Spegar's testimony by playing an audiotape containing Mr. 
Spegar's inconsistent statements; 
5. Whether the Commission erred in permitting its legal adviser to question 
witnesses and comment on the evidence on the record (Petitioner's objection is 
preserved at R. 633; 678); and 
6. Whether the Commission erred in affirming the termination of Officer 
Lucas when the internal affairs investigation was not completed within thirty days as 
required by Murray City Police Department Policy 555, III (E), and when Officer Lucas 
was not given written notification of the charges against him as required by Murray 
City Police Department Policy 555, III (G). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for issues (1), (4), (5) and (6) is a correction of 
error standard, giving no deference to the Commission's decision. King v. Industrial 
Comm'n. of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993). 
The standard of review for issues (2) and (3) is an abuse of discretion 
standard. Child v Salt Lake City Civ. Serv. Comm'n.. 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978). 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Constitution Article XI, Sec. 5 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1001 to 06 
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-1 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 103; 608; 1007 
Murray City Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations, §§ 3-4; 
11-1; 13-10 
Murray City Police Department Policy 555, III 
Department of Human Resource Management Rule 477-1 l-l(3)(e) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On August 21,1996, Officer Lucas was fired by the Murray City Police 
Department ("Police Department") for allegedly lying to his superiors during an internal 
affairs investigation concerning a claim of excessive force. Significantly, no discipline 
was given for excessive force because the charge was never substantiated. 
Nevertheless, the Murray City Corporation (sometimes hereinafter "Murray City" or 
the "City") terminated Officer Lucas' employment, claiming that his statements during 
the investigation were dishonest because they appeared to be inconsistent. 
Officer Lucas filed an appeal with the Commission challenging his 
dismissal. Prior to the hearing, the Commission entered an order preventing Officer 
Lucas from presenting any evidence that the decision to terminate his employment was 
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the inside of his pants toward his crotch as if reaching for a weapon. Officer Lucas 
immediately unsnapped his gun holster, placed his hand on the gun grip and forced Mr. 
Spegar to the wall. He then conducted a thorough search of Mr. Spegar, finding a pair 
of pliers and a small flashlight in his possession. Mr. Spegar was subsequently taken to 
jail without incident. (R. 793; 794; 795). 
5. Mr. Spegar did not complain that he was mistreated while at the Police 
Department. The first notice of a problem came two weeks later when a handwritten 
statement from Mr. Spegar was delivered to the Police Department. The statement 
alleges that a bald peace officer pointed a gun to Mr. Spegar's head and threatened to 
kill him. (R. 284; 285-6). 
6. Lt. Peter Fondaco of the Police Department commenced an internal 
affairs investigation on June 10,1996. The purpose of the investigation was to 
determine whether Officer Lucas had used excessive force in his arrest and subsequent 
search of Mr. Spegar. Lt. Fondaco did not provide Officer Lucas with a written 
statement of the charge as required by Police Department policy. (R. 302-10; 708-11). 
7. During the interrogation by Lt. Fondaco, Officer Lucas described his 
arrest and treatment of Mr. Spegar. Officer Lucas stated that he felt threatened when 
Mr. Spegar reached under his pants, rather than emptying his pockets. Officer Lucas 
stated that he instinctively unsnapped his holster and placed his hand on the gun grip. 
Officer Lucas then described his search of Mr. Spegar. (R 302-10). 
8. Officer Lucas told Lt. Fondaco that he did not remember removing his 
gun from his holster. Officer Lucas was subsequently informed that Officer Snow saw 
him with his gun to his side while he was in the room with Mr. Spegar. In a second 
interrogation, Officer Lucas indicated that he did not remember removing his gun from 
his holster, but admitted that it was possible since he had his attention focused on Mr. 
Spegar's threatening actions. Officer Lucas adamantly denies pointing his gun at Mr. 
Spegar or threatening to kill him. (R. 302-10; 801-2; 805). 
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included evidence that the police administration recently discovered that it was Officer 
Lucas who had complained to the Attorney General's Office. (R. 142-7). 
17. Understandably, Lt. Fondaco and Chief Killian denied that they knew it 
was Officer Lucas who had reported the police corruption and misconduct to the Utah 
Attorney General's Office. (R. 134-5; 136-7). 
18. The Commission excluded any evidence on the issue of retaliatory 
motives, intent and bias of Lt. Fondaco or Chief Killian. (R. 162-3). 
19. The Commission held an evidentiary hearing on November 19,1996. 
At the evidentiary hearing, the Commission's legal adviser questioned the witnesses and 
commented on the evidence over Officer Lucas' objections. The Commission, through 
its legal adviser, also prevented Officer Lucas' counsel from using the audiotape of the 
polygraph examination to impeach the testimony of Martin Spegar. (R. 611-13; 632-5; 
674-5) (See also, record citations catalogued in Section V, infra). 
20. Officer Lucas presented evidence to the Commission that in the three 
prior cases involving peace officer dishonesty, Murray City had terminated the 
employment of one junior officer who had falsified police reports, while only 
suspending the other two officers. (R. 755-8). 
21. On November 27,1996, the Commission affirmed the termination of 
Officer Lucas' employment. (R. 217-225) 
22. On December 12,1996, Officer Lucas filed his Petition for Review 
with this Court. (R. 228-29). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Commission Erred in Excluding Evidence of Retaliatory 
Motive, Intent and Bias 
Officer Lucas identified two fact witnesses who would testify or corroborate 
Officer Lucas' testimony that he had been discharged in retaliation for participating in 
an Attorney General's investigation of alleged misconduct and corrupt practices of the 
Murray City Police Department. Murray City filed a Motion in Limine to prevent such 
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information from being disclosed at the evidentiary hearing. The Commission granted 
the City's motion. 
The Commission's evidentiary ruling violates Murray City's rules and policies 
which allow an officer the right to a full hearing prior to a termination, violates the rules 
of evidence that allow parties to present all relevant evidence, and is contrary to the 
evidentiary rules regarding admissibility of evidence to impeach witnesses or to show 
bias. 
2. The Commission Erred in Finding that there was Sufficient 
Evidence to Support the Charge that Officer Lucas Lied 
During an Internal Affairs Investigation 
There was insufficient evidence presented to the Commission to find that 
Officer Lucas had lied during the internal affairs investigation. The City failed to 
affirmatively establish good cause for the termination. Because the evidence presented 
does not provide "substantial support" for the decision, the decision must be vacated as 
a matter of law. 
3. The Commission Erred in Not Finding The Discipline 
Excessive and Disproportionate to the Alleged Offense 
Officer Lucas is a twelve-year veteran of law enforcement who had a spotless 
record. He was fired for saying that he could not recall whether he had put his hand on 
his side-arm during a search of suspect, or whether he actually removed his weapon and 
pointed it at the ground. Assuming for the sake of argument that Officer Lucas 
withdrew his weapon and knew that he was pointing it at the ground during the search 
of Mr. Spegar, dismissal is excessive and disproportionate. 
Murray City follows a policy of progressive discipline. Officer Lucas had not 
been warned, reprimanded or suspended for misconduct. Moreover, other officers who 
had admitted to acts of dishonesty which were far more egregious have not been fired. 
During the pendency of the investigation, the City authorized Officer Lucas to effect 
arrests and testify on its behalf in Court proceedings. The termination of employment 
under these circumstances constitutes a clear abuse of authority. 
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4. The Commission Erred in Preventing the Impeachment of 
Martin Spegar 
Mr. Spegar was arrested and convicted for attempting to steal property from 
vehicles. Two weeks after his arrest, Mr. Spegar accused Officer Lucas of excessive 
force during a search at the station house. He originally accused Officer Lucas of 
pointing a gun directly at his head and threatening to "blow his fucking head off." 
During a taped polygraph examination, Mr. Spegar retracted that statement and 
admitted that Officer Lucas did not point a gun at his head, and that Mr. Spegar never 
feared for his life as he had previously stated. At the hearing, Mr. Spegar claimed 
during cross-examination that he did not remember making these admissions to the 
polygraph examiner. Officer Lucas* counsel attempted to play the audiotape to impeach 
Mr. Spegar's in court statements as well as to corroborate Officer Lucas1 testimony. The 
Commission's legal counsel, without an objection being made by the City's legal 
counsel, prohibited the playing of the tape on the ground that Mr. Spegar could not lay 
the foundation to identify his own voice. Thus, Mr. Spegar's testimony stood without 
impeachment. 
This evidentiary ruling is contrary to the rules of evidence regarding 
impeachment of fact witnesses, and the rules of waiver of objections. 
5. Improper Role of Mr. Ferguson, Legal Advisor for the 
Commission 
The Commission retained Dennis C. Ferguson as its legal counsel. The record 
demonstrates that Mr. Ferguson sat as a fourth Commissioner rather than an advisor. 
He asked questions of the witnesses, commented on the evidence, intervened during the 
proceedings, and made evidentiary rulings without request from the Commission. 
The statutes governing the organization and authority of administrative agencies 
were violated when the Commission allowed Mr. Ferguson to act as a "fourth 
commissioner." His involvement in the proceedings was material and detrimental to 
Officer Lucas. 
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6. The Commission Erred in Upholding the Termination when 
the City Admits that it did not Comply with its own Policies 
and Procedures 
Lt. Fondaco admitted that Murray City's Rules and Regulations regarding 
internal affair investigations were violated on several occasions during the investigation 
of Officer Lucas. As a merit employee, Officer Lucas has a legally recognized property 
interest to ensure that these procedures are followed. Since the City violated its own 
due process procedures, the Commission erred in upholding the termination. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT PREVENTED OFFICER LUCAS 
FROM PRESENTING A THEORY OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 
A. The Commission's Order Violates the Utah Rules of Evidence 
1. The Commission Was Bound to Follow the Utah 
Rules of Evidence 
Generally, an administrative agency is not required to strictly apply the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. See Pilcher v. Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450,453 (Utah 
1983). However, an exception to this rule exists if the agency, by its own rules or 
promulgations, has adopted the Utah Rules of Evidence or agreed to apply them. Id. 
Section 13-10 of the Murray City Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations 
states that the Commission shall follow the Utah Rules of Evidence as near as 
"practicable." Thus, unless "impractical" the Commission is bound to abide by the 
Utah Rules of Evidence1 and the cases interpreting those rules. See Pilcher. 663 P.2d at 
453. 
1
 The Commission's legal conclusions regarding what types of evidence are admissible 
are held to a correctness standard because those are legal determinations. State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201,1222 n.22 (Utah 1993). As a general principal, administrative agencies' 
legal conclusions are accorded no deference. E.g. King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 
1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Deference will be given to the Commission when it applies 
a correct legal principal to a set of facts. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attv. 818 
P.2d 23,26 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(discussing discretion given to administrative 
agencies). 
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On October 4,1996, pursuant to order of the Commission, Officer Lucas 
identified his witnesses as well as the basic scope of their testimony. In that list, Officer 
Lucas identified Ron Barton, an investigator with the Utah Attorney General's Office. 
He also identified Robert Evans, a former police officer of Murray City. These 
individuals were going to present evidence that would support Officer Lucas' 
contention that Chief Killian and Lt. Fondaco had fired Officer Lucas in retaliation for 
his cooperation with the Attorney General's investigation into police corruption and 
misconduct. (R.42-45). Murray City filed a motion in limine to prevent Officer Lucas 
from mentioning the Attorney General's investigation, or even alluding to the 
possibility that he had been terminated in retaliation for participation in that 
investigation. (R. 116-19). Officer Lucas proffered the testimony he would present to 
support a theory of retaliatory discharge. (R. 142-47). 
Although the City's motion did not contain a single citation to legal authority 
(R. 116-19), the Commission granted the City's Motion. Officer Lucas appeals from 
this decision on the grounds that the order violated the Utah Rules of Evidence, unfairly 
prejudiced Officer Lucas from presenting a basic tenant of his case (that he was fired as 
an act of retaliation), and lacked factual or legal findings to be sufficient as a matter of 
law. 
B. The Evidence was Admissible to Show Motive, Intent and Bias 
Utah law and the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically allow for the 
admission of evidence of a witness* bias, motive and intent. For example, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-24-1 (1996) states, in relevant part, that: 
[I]n every case the credibility of the witness may be 
drawn in question, by the manner in which he testifies, by 
the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting 
his character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his 
motives, or by contradictory evidence 
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Rule 608(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically provides that: 
Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of 
the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has applied these statutes and rules liberally to allow for the 
introduction of evidence concerning a witness1 bias, motive or intent. In State v. 
Hackford. 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987), the Court emphasized the importance of 
permitting the cross-examiner wide latitude in exposing a witness1 potential bias. While 
such a right is not without limitation, it is permissible for a party to introduce evidence 
of bias, prejudice or any other motive. Id. at 203. See also, Ong Int'l. Inc. v. Eleventh 
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,459 (Utah 1993) (it is well-established that testimony 
reflecting on bias of a witness is admissible at trial). 
While courts in Utah have not expressly addressed this issue in the context of an 
employment case, courts in other states have uniformly held that the employees motive 
and intent in firing an employee is directly relevant. See Lihoist v. I & W. Inc., 913 
P.2d 262,265 (N.M. App. 1996); Williams v. ABS Enterprises. Inc.. 734 P.2d 854, 856 
(Okla. App. 1987), E-Z Motor Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travellers Indemnity Co., 901, 726 
P.2d 439,443 (Wash. 1986). 
In this case, Lt. Fondaco conducted many of the witness interviews, evaluated 
the evidence, and made a conclusion that Officer Lucas was dishonest. (R. 327-337). 
He recommended to Chief Killian that Officer Lucas had to be fired. (R. 337). Lt. 
Fondaco's motivation, bias and intent in conducting the investigation, weighing the 
evidence, and making his recommendation of termination were directly at issue. It is 
Officer Lucas1 contention that Lt. Fondaco was biased against him as a result of Officer 
Lucas' complaint to the Attorney General's Office regarding Lt. Fondaco's use of 
excessive force. Such evidence was relevant and admissible to the issue of whether the 
decision to terminate Officer Lucas1 employment was appropriate and lawful. 
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Likewise, the complaint lodged by Officer Lucas to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office included an allegation of corruption in obtaining bids for vehicle repairs. The 
complaint was lodged against the Murray City Police Department as a whole, but the 
key player in the bid rigging scheme was alleged to be Lt. Fondaco. The evidence 
proffered by Officer Lucas demonstrates that the Attorney General's Office acceded to 
Chief Killian's demands to turn the investigation over to the Murray City Attorney's 
Office. The proffer also demonstrates that Chief Killian was very embarrassed about 
the investigation. This embarrassment, together with a general feeling of betrayal, 
caused Chief Killian to be biased against Officer Lucas. At a minimum, this bias 
played a role in how Chief Killian evaluated the charges against Office Lucas, and why 
he chose termination over a reprimand or suspension. 
Because the evidence concerning the true justification of the City's decision to 
fire Officer Lucas goes to the very core of the issue before the Commission, it was 
reversible error to disallow the evidence. See State v. Lenaburg. 781 P.2d 432 (Utah 
1989) (when possible, court should "strike balance" and admit needed evidence while 
excluding only prejudicial testimony); see also. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
1989) cert denied 485 U.S. 1036 (1988) (finding error on part of judge whom excluded 
evidence on ground that the proffered evidence seemed exaggerated or incredible; court 
can only disallow evidence on legal basis not factual basis). 
C. The Commission's Ruling Failed to Identify Any Rule or Reason 
Which Would Render the Proposed Evidence Inadmissible 
The Commission also erred in granting Murray City's Motion in Limine 
because it failed to make the appropriate findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
Specifically, the order granting the motion made no findings of fact or conclusions of 
law regarding the effect of the proffered evidence. The Commission also failed to cite 
any rule, case, reason, or theory upon which to exclude such evidence. The 
Commission's invasive ruling, without any statement of reason on the record, is an 
abuse of discretion and reversible error as a matter of law. See State v. Patterson. 656 
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P.2d 438 (Utah 1982). In Patterson, the Utah Supreme Court found "improper" and an 
"abuse of discretion" a trial court's decision to exclude evidence on the grounds that it 
might confuse or prejudice the trier of fact, or waste time, without making findings on 
the record that the proposed evidence would waste time, be confusing, or be prejudicial. 
Id. at 439. "An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law that are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review." LaSal 
Oil Co. v. Dept. of Envt'l Quality, 843 P.2d 1045,1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Failure 
to make such findings of fact renders a decision "arbitrary and capricious" unless the 
evidence is clear and uncontroverted on the topic, and there is only one possible 
conclusion. Hidden Valley Coal Co. v. Utah Bd. of Oil, 866 P.2d 564, 568 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
D. Rule 403 Does Not Apply to Theories of Defense, But Rather Specific 
Pieces of Evidence 
The Commission will likely argue that its decision to exclude evidence of bias 
or retaliation was based upon Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. As specifically 
stated in that rule, its terms only apply to individual pieces of evidence, not affirmative 
defenses. See Utah R. Evid. 403. This Court has previously held that due process 
requires not only that a party be allowed to present one's evidence at an administrative 
hearing, but "one's contentions" as well. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attv.. 818 P.2d 
23, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Commission's order excluded all evidence and 
reference to Officer Lucas1 claim that he was fired for retaliatory purposes. 
Consequently, the Commission's order was too broad. 
It is unlawful for an employee to be fired in retaliation for reporting misconduct 
to the authorities. See Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank. Ltd., 879 P.2d 1288 (Or. App. 
1994) (employer may not discharge employee for filing claims); D'Angelo v. Gardner. 
819 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1991) (employer may not discharge employee for refusing to work 
in unsafe environment). 
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In this case, Officer Lucas and others reported police misconduct and corruption 
to the Utah Attorney General's Office. The Attorney General initiated an investigation 
into the affairs of Lt. Fondaco and the Murray City Police Department. The preliminary 
investigation revealed elements of a bid rigging scheme associated with vehicular 
repairs. The investigation was stopped at the insistence of Chief Killian. Given the 
incident in question, the nature of the investigation and the severity of the discipline, 
Officer Lucas should have been allowed to present as a theory, regardless of the 
evidence weighing in favor or against the theory, that the decision to terminate his 
employment was based on retaliatory motives and bias against him. "Ignoring a party's 
legal contentions denies the party a fair opportunity to be heard." Tolman. 818 P.2d at 
31 (citation omitted). The Commission's order granting Murray City's Motion in Limine 
was clear error which warrants that the case be remanded for a new hearing. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO UPHOLD THE TERMINATION 
OF OFFICER LUCAS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT 
MATERIAL EVIDENCE 
This Court should vacate the Commission's ruling on the grounds that 
insufficient evidence was presented to support the City's decision to fire Officer Lucas. 
A. Evidence Supporting The Commission's Decision 
The following evidence was presented to the Commission which could, if 
construed in a light favorable to the decision, be viewed as supportive of the 
Commission's conclusions: 
1. Upon reaching the station house, Officer Lucas unhandcuffed Mr. 
Spegar, put his arms against the wall and searched him a second time. (R. 553-4). 
2. Officer Lucas ordered Mr. Spegar to stand and to empty his pockets at 
the station house. (R. 557). 
3. Mr. Spegar testified that while emptying his pockets, Officer Lucas, at a 
distance of approximately three feet, took out his weapon, pointed it at him, 
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"somewhere in [his] direction" and said "if you pull out a gun or whatever, I'll blow 
your fucking head off, I promise." (R. 557). 
4. On the evening of this incident, Mr. Spegar was wearing old pants with a 
broken fly, but they were not baggy. (R. 558). 
5. Dustin Garcia, who was also arrested that night, testified that he 
overheard Officer Lucas threatening Mr. Spegar. (R. 558). 
6. Mr. Garcia was in an enclosed room, but the door was open. The room 
was alternatively 20 feet to 20 yards away from Mr. Spegar and Officer Lucas. (R. 581; 
608). 
7. Approximately ten days later, Lt. Rowland received a telephone call 
from Gil Garcia telling him about the incident. (R. 589-90). Lt. Rowland testified that 
in this telephone conversation he was informed that one of the arresting officers had 
pulled a gun on Mr. Spegar. The officer was described as a balding officer. (R. 590). 
8. Each of three individual arrestees involved on the evening in question 
was put into a room toward the south end of the station. (R. at 606). One of the 
individuals was placed in the "interview room" (Dustin Garcia) while the other two 
individuals (Martin Spegar and Michael Hamblin) were placed in the first and second 
offices respectively. (R. 606-607). 
9. Officer Snow asked Officer Lucas to "keep an eye" on Mr. Spegar while 
he went to speak with Mr. Garcia. (R. at 609). 
10. Having left Officer Lucas with Mr. Spegar, and returning from his 
conversation with Mr. Garcia, Officer Snow observed Officer Lucas standing in the 
doorway of the room with "his side arm out of the holster, pointing at the ground." (R. 
610). At this same time, Officer Snow observed Mr. Spegar taking items out of his 
pocket and putting them on the desk in the room. (R. 610-11). Officer Snow was 
approximately four feet away from Officer Lucas while he made these observations. 
(R.611). 
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11. Officer Snow found it somewhat odd that Officer Lucas had his gun to 
his side because in his opinion it was not an officer safety issue at the time. (R. 611). 
12. Officer Snow had not felt in jeopardy while he had been speaking with 
Mr. Spegar. (R. 612-13). 
13. Officer Snow testified that he did not suspect Mr. Spegar had a weapon 
on him at the time. (R. 613). 
14. Lt. Fondaco met with Chief Killian, described the complaint, and told 
Chief Killian that Officer Snow had actually witnessed Officer Lucas with his weapon 
out of the holster. (R. 682-83). Lt. Fondaco gave Officer Lucas a Garrity warning and 
testified that officers employed by Murray City have been trained in what Garrity 
means. (R. 683). 
15. Lt. Fondaco testified that Officer Lucas denied in an interview that he 
had his weapon out of his holster at the time in question. (R. 687). 
16. Lt. Fondaco interviewed Officer Snow a second time to have him clarify 
what he believed took place. (R. 687). 
17. Upon request of the Police Department, Mr. Spegar gave a polygraph 
examination. (R. 690). 
18. The Police Department received the results of the polygraph of Marty 
Spegar but did not receive a polygraph exam report following the polygraph of Officer 
Lucas. Instead, it received a written report from the polygrapher regarding Officer 
Lucas' statements. (R. 692). 
19. Lt. Fondaco prepared a summary of the case against Officer Lucas to 
present to Chief Killian. The report was introduced as Exhibit No. 12 of the official 
exhibits. (R. 692). All items constituting Exhibits 1 through 11, and Exhibit 13 were 
utilized in the development of Lt. Fondaco's report. (R. 693-94). 
20. Lt. Fondaco felt he could identify seven discrepancies in Officer Lucas' 
statements to him. Those alleged discrepancies are as follows: 
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(1) Officer Lucas indicated to Lt. Fondaco that he was not 
present when the arrestees in question were advised of their rights and 
written statements taken from them. However, Officer Snow testified 
that Officer Lucas was around for approximately 45 minutes. Therefore, 
he did not immediately leave as his statement indicated. (R. 695-96). 
(2) Officer Lucas stated that his only additional contact 
with the arrestees after they were all under control of Officer Snow 
was that he had a confrontation with Michael Hamblin. Lt. 
Fondaco believed this was not true because Officer Lucas admitted 
to "going back in and researching" Mr. Spegar. (R. 696). 
(3) Officer Lucas admitted to searching Mr. Spegar and 
claimed that during the search, Mr. Spegar inserted his hands into 
his crotch area in what Officer Lucas perceived to be an attempt to 
retrieve a weapon. Officer Lucas then indicated that in response he 
unsnapped his weapon and said "don't do that," put Mr. Spegar up 
against the wall, and searched him, but Officer Lucas denied any 
other allegation made by Mr. Spegar. Lt. Fondaco points to this 
account as an inconsistency since Officer Snow testified that he 
saw Officer Lucas with a weapon out of its holster. (R. 697). 
(4) Lt. Fondaco again repeated that Officer Lucas 
denied having his weapon out of its holster but indicates that 
Marty Spegar and Officer Snow both state that they saw his 
weapon out of the holster. (R. 698). 
(5) Officer Lucas denied threatening to kill Martin 
Spegar, while another arrestee, Dustin Garcia, claims to have 
overheard it. (R. 699). 
(6) &(7) Officer Lucas' statement that he had a grip on his 
gun but never pointed it at Martin Spegar, yet Mr. Spegar and 
Officer Snow both stated that the weapon was out of Officer 
Lucas' holster. 
21. Lt. Fondaco testified that in no part of Officer Lucas' statement did he 
recall removing the weapon from the holster, whether pointed at the floor or in the 
direction of the arrestee. (R. 699-700). 
22. Lt. Fondaco testified, without explaining what they were, that there were 
discrepancies in Officer Lucas' pretermination statement to Chief Killian. (R. 700). 
23. Lt. Fondaco concluded that "due to the seriousness of these violations 
and the implications created by them, the only recommendation available would have to 
be termination." (R. 701). He further testified that Officer Lucas' untruthfulness and 
dishonesty violated Murray City Police Department policy and procedure as well as the 
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morals of the community and placed him in a position where his credibility and 
integrity as a police officer would be questioned at every facet of his employment. (R. 
701). 
24. Lt. Fondaco testified that he was sure in his belief that Officer Lucas did 
not tell the truth in the internal affairs investigation from the point of giving the Garrity 
warning. It was his belief that Officer Lucas pointed his weapon at Marty Spegar and 
then denied that fact to Lt. Fondaco in the internal affairs investigation. (R. 702). 
25. Lt. Fondaco testified that he believed that any officer could answer 
within one week or two weeks after a specific incident whether or not he or she pulled 
his or her weapon. (R. 704). 
26. Having received a summary and findings of Lt. Fondaco, Chief Killian 
scheduled a pretermination hearing of Officer Lucas. (R. 767). A pretermination 
hearing was conducted on August 7,1996. (R. 767). 
27. Subsequent to the pretermination hearing, Chief Killian met with Officer 
Snow and discussed the matter. (R. 768). 
28. Chief Killian made a decision to terminate the employment of Officer 
Lucas "approximately two weeks after the hearing," or alternatively, on August 14, 
1996. (R. 768). 
29. Chief Killian had "problems" with terminating an officer with twelve 
years experience and "did not want to have to do something like that." (R. 768-69). 
30. In Chief Killian's opinion, the most important characteristic of a police 
officer is honesty. (R. 769). 
31. As of August 21,1996, the date of the Letter of Termination, Chief 
Killian had reached a conclusion that he could not trust Officer Lucas. (R. 769). 
32. Officer Lucas testified that at the scene of the arrest of Messrs. Spegar, 
Garcia and Hamblin, he did not consider the incident a critical one because he saw no 
weapons. (R. 808). 
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33. Officer Lucas testified that at the scene of arrest when the suspects were 
fleeing he ordered them to stop or he would "blow their brains out." (R. 808). 
34. Officer Lucas did not prepare a supplemental report after the incident 
identifying that he had unsnapped his weapon in the office. (R. 812). 
35. Officer Lucas actually "unsnapped" his weapon twice to the best of his 
recollection. (R. 815). 
36. Officer Lucas could not recall whether he had told Lt. Fondaco, Sgt. 
Peterson or Chief Killian that he had actually unsnapped his weapon twice. (R. 815). 
37. After talking to Officer Snow, Officer Lucas had doubts about what had 
actually happened in the office with Mr. Spegar, but because this was an excessive force 
investigation, and not an honesty investigation, he did not seek out Lt. Fondaco to tell 
Lt. Fondaco that he did not completely recall all incidents that occurred in the room. 
(R. 818). 
B. Evidence Making the Commission's Findings Unreasonable 
The following evidence presented to the Commission at the hearing on 
November 19,1996, demonstrates that it was unreasonable for the Commission to 
conclude that the evidence marshalled above supported a decision to terminate Officer 
Lucas. 
Marty Spegar 
Marty Spegar was the individual who accused Officer Lucas of excessive force 
and is the only claimed direct eyewitness of all of the relevant events. The following 
evidence directly discredits or contradicts the testimony he gave the Commission: 
1. Mr. Spegar admitted to attempted vehicle burglary, a felony involving 
dishonesty. (R. 551). 
2. Mr. Spegar initially accused Officer Lucas of pointing his gun directly at 
his head and threatening to kill him. (R. 285-6). However, Mr. Spegar recanted after 
he learned he failed to pass the polygraph examination. (R. 557). 
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3. Mr. Spegar identified the gun allegedly pointed at him as being all black. 
(R. 571). In fact, Officer Lucas' weapon is chrome with only a black handle. (R. 742). 
4. Although Mr. Spegar claims his life had just been threatened by a police 
officer, Mr. Spegar never told any of the other officers or jailers about the incident. (R. 
571-74). 
5. Mr. Spegar failed a polygraph exam when interviewed about the event. 
He scored a negative three (-3) on the exam. (Exhibit 11; R. 323-26). A score of 
positive seven (+7) is required as the lowest score to demonstrate credibility. (Exhibit 
11; R. 323-26). 
6. Mr. Spegar admitted to telling the polygraphed Sgt. Peterson, that he 
now believes that his life was not threatened by Officer Lucas. (R. 575). He further 
stated that he didn't know whether he felt threatened at all. (R. 575-76). 
7. When asked whether he had indicated to the internal affairs investigators 
that the gun was pointed to his head during the time he was emptying his pockets, Mr. 
Spegar could not answer, indicating that he did not know. (R. 576). 
8. Although Mr. Spegar's life had allegedly just been threatened, he never 
mentioned the subject to his friends while being transported to jail, and in fact told 
jokes during the car ride to jail. (R. 630). 
9. Although Mr. Spegar claimed Officer Lucas had threatened to "blow his 
fucking brains out" he did not even remember Officer Lucas' name when first 
questioned about the incident. (R. 741). 
10. Mr. Spegar gave contradictory statements about whether he had already 
emptied his pockets before the alleged gun incident, yet Officer Snow, at a distance of 
only four feet, clearly saw that Mr. Spegar did have objects in his pockets that he 
emptied upon Officer Lucas' request. (R. 625; 639). 
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Dustin Garcia 
Dustin Garcia was arrested with Mr. Spegar on the evening in question. He is 
the only individual who claims to have overheard Officer Lucas making threats to Mr. 
Spegar. However, the following evidence demonstrates that Mr. Garcia's testimony 
could not have been the basis of a reasonable decision to fire Officer Lucas: 
1. Dustin Garcia testified that he was in the room right next to Mr. Spegar 
and that "through the wall" he heard Officer Lucas threatening his friend Mr. Spegar. 
(R. 580-81, 588). However, the testimony of all of the other witnesses presented by the 
City, including Officer Snow and Lt. Rowland, indicated that Dustin Garcia was in fact 
the farthest away from Mr. Spegar, in an interview room which was alternatively 20 feet 
to 20 yards away from Mr. Spegar. (R. at 625). 
2. Michael Hamblin was arrested with Messrs. Garcia and Spegar. He was 
in the room adjacent to Mr. Spegar. Mr. Hamblin stated that he did not overhear or see 
anything to substantiate Messrs. Spegar and Garcia's allegation. (R. 312). 
3. Although Dustin Garcia claims to have overheard threats by Officer 
Lucas while some 20 feet to 20 yards away, Officer Snow testified that if anyone would 
have been yelling in the office, "you could have heard it from one end to the other." (R. 
614). Nevertheless, Officer Snow, who was at all times closer than Dustin Garcia, and 
at the time of the alleged gun drawing was only 4 feet from Officer Lucas, did not hear 
anything to substantiate the allegations of Messrs. Spegar or Garcia. (R. 611, 612-14). 
Officer Snow further stated that it would be very hard to overhear someone using a 
speaking voice from Mr. Garcia's position. (R. 637) 
4. Although Dustin Garcia claims that he overheard an officer threatening 
to kill his friend, the first time he mentioned the incident to anyone was in a "casual 
conversation" with his parents some 3 or 4 days after the fact. (R. 582). 
5. Mr. Garcia testified that he and Mr. Spegar discussed the matter at length 
immediately after the incident. (R. 585). However, Mr. Spegar reported that he didn't 
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tell anyone about the event at the time because he didn't originally think Officer Lucas 
had done anything wrong. (R. 295-97). 
Officer Snow 
Officer Snow is a police officer working for the Murray Police Department. He 
testified as follows: 
1. When Officer Lucas spoke to Officer Snow about his involvement in the 
investigation, Officer Lucas told him to "tell the truth, tell them what happened." (R. 
618). 
2. Officer Snow was only 4 feet away from Officer Lucas at the time Mr. 
Spegar was emptying his pockets and he saw Officer Lucas with his weapon pointed to 
the ground. Officer Snow did not overhear the statements that Mr. Spegar claims 
Officer Lucas made, and that Dustin Garcia, some 20 feet to 20 yards away, claims to 
have overheard. (R. 625). 
3. Officer Lucas never raised his gun from the ground, and never threatened 
Mr. Spegar. (R. 625). 
4. Officer Snow testified that he transported Messrs. Spegar and Garcia to 
the jail after the incident. (R. 630-31). He indicates that during that time there was no 
conversation between the arrestees of the alleged incident but that instead Mr. Spegar 
was telling jokes. (R. 630). 
5. Officer Snow corroborated Officer Lucas' testimony that Mr. Spegar had 
metal objects in his pockets, and Officer Snow saw Mr. Spegar remove these objects 
from his pockets at the same time he saw Officer Lucas with his gun pointed to the 
ground. (R. 625; 639). 
6. Officer Snow indicated that he did not believe the incident involving 
Officer Lucas' gun being out of its holster was even worthy of being mentioned in his 
routine report; accordingly, Officer Snow never made a report of the incident until 
requested to do so as part of the internal affairs investigation. (R. 629). 
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7. Officer Snow testified that police officers are trained under the premise 
that an individual carrying a "straight-edge" weapon can cover an area of twenty-one 
(21) feet before an officer could even react by drawing his or her weapon. (R. 631). 
8. Officer Snow corroborated the statement of Officer Lucas that Officer 
Lucas was not present for the mirandizing of Mr. Spegar, even through Lt. Fondaco 
listed that statement as an inconsistency by Officer Lucas. (R. 628). 
9. Officer Snow testified that he wasn't concerned at the sight of Officer 
Lucas' weapon because Officer Snow knows Officer Lucas to be a senior officer and 
just assumed Officer Lucas "had a good reason for doing so." (R. 630). 
10. Officer Snow testified that at the time Mr. Spegar was emptying his 
pockets (and at the time Mr. Spegar alleges that Officer Lucas threatened to kill him), 
Mr. Spegar's demeanor was calm and unagitated. (R. 641). 
11. Officer Snow testified that if a suspect put his hands in his crotch after 
being told to empty his pockets, he too would be concerned for safety. (R. 639). 
Dr. Kenneth Rogers 
Dr. Rogers is a clinical psychologist who testified on behalf of Officer Lucas. 
He was the only expert witness called, and his testimony was uncontradicted by the 
City. Dr. Rogers offered the following evidence: 
1. Dr. Rogers has vast experience in the area of employment related post-
traumatic stress. (R. 646). 
2. When an individual is in a critical incident or in a situation perceived as 
extremely stressful, the brain will focus on singular aspects of an incident to the 
exclusion of other aspects. (R. 648). 
3. The incident causing one person to have this memory exclusion or 
"tunnel vision" is subjective rather than objective. (R. 648). 
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4. Dr. Rodgers has had experience dealing with law enforcement officers 
faced with flight versus flight situations, and that it is his experience they are not able to 
completely perceive all events accurately. (R. 652). 
5. Dr. Rodgers reviewed all the statements of Officer Lucas presented in 
the internal affairs investigation, including his interview with Lt. Fondaco, and the 
polygraph report. (R. 654). 
6. Dr. Rodgers opined that Officer Lucas' statements were consistent with 
an individual experiencing perceptual distortions, and that in his opinion Officer Lucas 
was "telling the truth." (R. 655). 
7. Dr. Rodgers testified that Officer Lucas' statements were consistent 
"across persons and across time, which lends credence, in [his] opinion, to a person 
telling the truth." He found Officer Lucas to be non-defensive in his statements and 
willing to accept that another officer perceived something different than himself, and 
not challenging that, but sticking with original perception. (R. 655-56). 
Lt. Pete Fondaco 
Lt. Fondaco is a lieutenant with the Murray City Police Department and the 
internal affairs investigator for the incident in question. Lt. Fondaco offered the 
following testimony which renders the Commission's findings untenable: 
1. Lt. Fondaco admitted to violating Murray City Policy and Procedure 
during the investigation of Officer Lucas, including, but not limited to, the fact that 
Officer Lucas was never informed in writing of the initial charge against him, that he 
was never informed at any point that the charge against him had changed from 
excessive force to dishonesty, and that the investigation was not concluded within 30 
days as required by policy. (R. 708-11). 
2. In direct contravention to his report that the only option available to 
Chief Killian was termination, Lt. Fondaco testified that he did not ask to have Officer 
Lucas put on administrative leave during the pendency of the investigation. Lt. 
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Fondaco knew that Officer Lucas would be called upon to make arrests, to testify at trial 
and to use his weapon during the pendency of the investigation. (R. 718). Lt Fondaco 
was not concerned that Officer Lucas might misuse his weapon because "[Officer 
Lucas] is too good an officer for that. No, that would never happen." (R. 718-19). 
3. Lt. Fondaco testified that for more than a month following the allegation, 
Officer Lucas continued to represent the Murray City Police Department without 
incident or problem. (R. 719-20). 
4. Lt. Fondaco conceded to the following: 
(a) He could not substantiate that Marty Spegar was thrown against the 
wall and searched (R. 721); 
(b) He could not substantiate that Officer Lucas made threats to Mr. 
Spegar's life (R 721); 
(c) He could did not substantiate the statement that Officer Lucas' gun 
was pointed to Mr. Spegar's head or at his head (R. 721); 
(d) He could not substantiate Mr. Spegar's claims that he did not have 
any tools in his pockets at the time of the alleged incident; and 
(e) He could not substantiate the claim that Mr. Spegar "did not go for 
his crotch" as if reaching for a weapon. (R. 721-22). 
5. Lt. Fondaco admitted that he is aware of other individuals disciplined by 
the Police Department for incidents involving dishonesty, yet who were not fired. (R. 
760-62). 
6. Lt. Fondaco did not review Mr. Spegar's admissions to the polygraph 
examiner. (R. 726) 
Chief Killian 
Chief Killian is the Chief of Police of the Murray City Police Department. 
Chief Killian offered the following relevant testimony: 
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1. Chief Killian admitted that the Police Department follows a policy of 
progressive discipline. (R. 769) 
2. Chief Killian testified that in his twelve years with the Police 
Department, Officer Lucas had never been warned, reprimanded or suspended for 
dishonesty. (R. 770). 
3. Chief Killian admitted that the charge of excessive force originally 
brought against Officer Lucas (the denial of which is the alleged dishonesty) is "just 
something that was not completely proven." (R. 770-71). 
4. Chief Killian did not review all relevant evidence before he fired Officer 
Lucas. (R. 771). 
5. Chief Killian decided to fire Officer Lucas because Officer Lucas did not 
admit that he could not remember if he pulled his gun out of his holster. (R. 772-3). 
However, the pre-termination transcript demonstrates that Officer Lucas told Chief 
Killian at least five times that he did not remember if he removed his gun from the 
holster. (R. 367; 368; 371; 373; 374). 
C. The Commission's Findings Should be Overturned 
Officer Lucas concedes that this Court should grant deference to the 
Commission's findings of fact. Nevertheless, the Commission's findings should be 
upheld only if they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the Court." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted) (reviewing case under UAPA). See also. 
Stegen v. Dept. of Empl. Sec. 751 P.2d 1160,1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Pre-UAPA) 
(appellate court may substitute its interpretation of record for agency's if findings not 
supported by substantial evidence). Findings that are "clearly against the logic and 
effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application, or against the 
reasonable and probable deductions" thereof are an "abuse of discretion." Tolman. 815 
P.2d at 26. A review of all evidence presented to the Commission, marshaled in 
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favor of the Commission's decision, demonstrates that there was not substantial support 
for the finding that Officer Lucas lied during the investigation. 
Therefore, this Court should substitute its judgment for that of the Commission 
since the Commission's decision is not substantially supported by competent evidence. 
Id.; Steeen. 751 P.2d at 1163.. 
1. Insufficient Evidence Existed to Sustain the Termination 
The evidence, when taken as a whole, demonstrates that Murray City did not 
prove that Officer Lucas knowingly lied during the internal affairs investigation. The 
following five uncontroverted points render the Commission's decision unreasonable: 
1. Officer Lucas' accuser made inconsistent statements 
about the alleged events and then recanted part of his 
story; 
2. The only other corroborator, Dustin Garcia, could not 
have overheard the threats he claims to have heard 
through the wall because he was down the hall, some 
20 feet to 20 yards away; 
3. Any failure of Officer Lucas to recall precisely 
whether he only placed his hand on his weapon or 
actually drew it is normal psychological behavior 
under the circumstances; 
4. Officer Lucas, who confirmed with another officer 
who saw his weapon out, encouraged that officer to tell 
the investigators the truth; and 
5. Officer Lucas continued to perform his duties, 
including testifying in Court, despite the City's belief 
that he was a dishonest officer. 
These points demonstrate that if any inconsistencies existed in Officer Lucas' 
statements, they were not attributable to an intent to deceive. They further demonstrate 
that no evidence existed to justify the termination in lieu of a lesser discipline. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE 
PUNISHMENT EXCEEDED THE ALLEGED OFFENSE 
Murray City is precluded from firing an employee if termination is 
disproportionate to the alleged offense. Vetterli v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Salt Lake 
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Citv, 145 P.2d 792 (Utah 1944). The City had the affirmative burden to prove that 
Officer Lucas violated Department policy and its discipline was justified under the 
circumstances. Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Louis Jones, et al., 908 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (police department's punishment must be consistent and proportionate to the 
offense). Officer Lucas maintained that even if the Commission believed he had 
violated Police Department policy, the discipline of termination was disproportionate to 
the alleged offense. 
In order to determine whether the discipline is disproportionate, the trier-of-fact 
must examine whether it has been consistently applied in the past. See e.g.. Department 
of Human Resource Management Rule 477-11-1 (3)(e). Based on the circumstances as 
alleged against Officer Lucas, and the history of similarly accused officers of the 
Murray City Police Department, Murray City did not satisfy its burden of justifying 
termination. 
A. Murray City Violated its own Policy of Progressive Discipline 
Murray City has a policy of progressive discipline. (Section 11-1, Murray City 
Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations; R. at 769). Progressive discipline 
exists to ensure that similarly situated public employees are treated in a similar fashion, 
and the politics underlying public employment do not become a source of improper or 
excessive discipline. Louis Jones, 908 P.2d at 872. Courts have held that when an 
officer is disciplined outside of established procedures of progressive discipline, the 
discipline must be reversed, and in the case of termination, the officer must be 
reinstated. See, e ^ , Anderson v. Citv of Lawton. 748 P.2d 53 (Ok. App. 1987). In that 
case, the court reinstated an officer who had been terminated following a violent 
domestic dispute which required the intervention of other officers. The terminated 
officer was intoxicated and physically violent toward members of his family and 
intervening police officers. However, because the city had not imposed a lesser type of 
discipline, in a progressive manner, the court reversed the termination. Id. at 55. 
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In this case, Officer Lucas has served as an exemplary officer for over twelve 
years. He received the highest award of achievement given by the City to a police 
officer. There was no evidence presented by the City that Officer Lucas had received 
any prior warnings, reprimands or suspensions for misconduct. Consequently, the City 
was required to impose some lesser discipline unless the circumstances were so grave as 
to warrant termination. Here, there was no credible evidence presented to warrant 
termination as the first sanction. 
B. There was no Credible Evidence of Intent to Deceive 
The Commission's decision was an abuse of discretion given the uncontroverted 
expert testimony of Dr. Kenneth Rodgers, a licensed psychologist. Dr. Rodgers 
testified that a person in Officer Lucas' situation (searching a potentially hostile felon) 
would likely experience 'tunnel vision" and hence not recall whether he actually pulled 
his weapon or only gripped its handle. (R. 648-52, 55). Dr. Rodgers also testified that 
when an officer experiences tunnel vision, he subconsciously fills-in the memory 
lapses. Thus, even if Officer Lucas1 statements were inconsistent, there was no 
evidence that he intended to deceive the City. Dr. Rodgers testified that Officer Lucas' 
testimony and statements during the entire investigation were consistent with the 
phenomenon of an officer attempting to tell the truth but not recalling every detail of a 
hostile scenario. (R. 655). The City did not present any credible evidence to the 
contrary. 
Moreover, the City's own actions support the conclusion that it did not believe 
Officer Lucas was dishonest. Lt. Fondaco admitted that the City did not place Officer 
Lucas on administrative leave during the investigation because Officer Lucas was "too 
good an officer" to behave improperly. (R. 719-20). He was allowed to carry his 
service revolver, effect arrests, and testify in Court proceedings on behalf of the City. 
Consequently, even if the City believed Officer Lucas was being less than candid during 
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the investigation, its actions demonstrate that it did not believe the conduct was so 
egregious as to warrant termination. 
IV. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN PROHIBITING OFFICER LUCAS 
FROM PLAYING AN AUDIOTAPE WHEREIN HIS ACCUSER 
RECANTED HIS CLAIMS 
A defendant can introduce evidence to impeach in court statements of a witness 
and to impeach a witness's credibility. Utah R. Evid. 608(c); Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-
1; One Int'l. Inc. v. Eleventh Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,449 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Hackford. 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987). 
Under cross-examination, Mr. Spegar denied that he recanted his charges of 
excessive force to the polygraph examiner. (R. 574). When Officer Lucas1 counsel 
attempted to impeach Mr. Spegar by playing a tape wherein Mr. Spegar stated that the 
gun was not pointed at his head and his life wasn't threatened, the Commission's legal 
adviser stopped him. Mr. Ferguson unilaterally found that there was insufficient 
foundation to play the tape. (R. 575). Prior to introducing the audiotape, Officer Lucas1 
counsel laid the following foundation: 
(1) that Mr. Spegar had taken a polygraph test (R. at 573-4); and 
(2) that the polygraph test and Spegar's discussions with the 
polygrapher had been tape recorded (R. at 574). 
Nevertheless, when counsel attempted to have Mr. Spegar identify his own 
voice on the audiotape, the following discussion took place on the record: 
Mr. Benevento to Spegar: 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Do you know if it [the polygraph] was tape recorded? 
The polygraph? 
Yeah. 
I'm pretty sure it was. 
Have you had a chance to review that tape with the City 
Attorney's Office? 
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A: No, I haven't. 
Mr. Benevento: If I may, I have a copy of the tape here. Fd like to play 
just a portion to impeach. 
Mr. Ferguson (legal advisor to the Commission): Not without some 
authenticity. 
Mr. Benevento: Can I at least play it and [see] if it's his voice? 
Mr. Hall: No, I'll object. 
Mr. Ferguson: I think you've got to have the right witness here to lay 
the foundation. (R. 574-5). 
The decision by the Commission (or that is, Mr. Ferguson) to disallow the tape 
recording was erroneous. The Utah Rules of Evidence allow a witness to lay the 
foundation to authenticate a recording of his or her own voice. Moreover, no objection 
was made by opposing counsel prior to Mr. Ferguson's intervention, so any objection 
should have been waived. 
A. A Witness May Authenticate His Own Recorded Voice 
The ruling preventing introduction of the tape was based solely on foundation. 
(R. at 574). Utah law regarding foundation clearly establishes that a fact witness 
whose voice is recorded can authenticate and lay foundation for the recording. Rule 
1007 of the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically states: 
Contents of. . . recordings.. .may be proved by the 
testimony or deposition of the party against whom offered, 
or by the party's written admission, without accounting 
for the non production of the original. 
Therefore, Mr. Ferguson's decision to prohibit the playing of the tape, even for the 
purpose of having Mr. Spegar identify his own voice, was clear error. State v. Moore, 
788 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (tape recording 
of prior statement of defendant admissible). The error was harmful to Officer Lucas' 
case because he was prevented from having the Commissioners hear Marty Spegar 
recant part of his story. It was also prejudicial because the Commissioners were not 
allowed to assess Mr. Spegarfs demeanor and credibility while being impeached. 
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Finally, it was prejudicial because Officer Lucas1 counsel could not follow-up on a line 
of questioning which bore on the most critical aspect of the case, namely whether 
Officer Lucas drew his weapon. 
B. Murray City Waived Any Objection 
The City did not object to the playing of the tape prior to Mr. Ferguson's 
intervention. (R. at 574). Moreover, no Commissioner individually questioned the 
matter. (R. at 574). Utah law is well settled that failure by opposing counsel to raise an 
evidentiary objection waives any future argument regarding the admissibility of the 
evidence. Utah R. Evid. 103. The law is equally settled that a blanket objection is 
insufficient, but that a specific and timely objection must be made. E.g. State v. 
Schreuden 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986) (to preserve argument, objection must be clear, 
specific and timely). Therefore, the City waived any objection to playing the tape for 
the purpose of impeaching Mr. Spegar's testimony. 
V. 
THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ALLOWING ITS 
LEGAL ADVISOR TO PARTICIPATE AS A COMMISSIONER 
The scope of authority given to administrative agencies is limited. The Utah 
Constitution delegates all power to charter such agencies to the State Legislature. Utah 
Const. Art. XI, Sec.5. The Legislature has narrowly tailored the organization and 
authority of agencies. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1001 to -06. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that whenever a question arises as to whether an administrative agency has the 
authority to act in a manner not expressly provided by statute, courts must error toward 
restricting the agency's authority rather than allowing unpermitted acts to occur. 
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988). Courts reviewing actions 
of commissions "should be bound by the principle" that when a "specific power is 
conferred by statute upon a . . . commission with limited powers, [its] powers are 
limited to such as are specifically mentioned." Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 134 P.2d 469,474 (Utah 1943) (emphasis added). "To ensure that the 
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administrative powers of the [Commission] are not overextended, 'any reasonable doubt 
of the existence of any power must be resolved against the existence thereof.'" 
Williams. 754 P.2d at 50. Furthermore, the Utah Code requires a civil service 
commission to create and presumably follow its own rules and regulations. See Utah 
Code Ann. §10-3-1006. 
In this case, the Commission's rules and regulations do not provide for the use of 
outside legal counsel at all, let alone allow such an adviser to fully participate in the 
fact-finding process with the Commissioners. Murray City Civil Service Commission 
Rules and Regulations § 3-4. (outlining power of Commission). 
The Commission retained Dennis Ferguson to act as its legal counsel. Mr. 
Ferguson was allowed by the Commission to actively participate in the proceedings. 
The record is replete with instances where Mr. Ferguson asked questions of witnesses, 
made legal rulings without request by any Commissioner, commented on evidence, 
made interpretations of evidence on the record, made evidentiary rulings without 
objection from counsel, and so forth. These acts go beyond what is reasonable of an 
"advisor." In fact, a review of the record demonstrates that he spoke on the record more 
than all Commissioners combined. (See, e.g.. R. 532; 536; 539-40; 570; 575; 589; 600; 
602; 711-13; 623; 632-35; 662; 674-5; 723; 732; 734-6; 751; 755; 757-9; 828-9). Mr. 
Ferguson actually conducted extensive factual interrogation of witnesses such as Dr. 
Rodgers, Officer Snow, and even the Petitioner, Officer Lucas. (R. at 611-13; 632-6; 
674-5; 823-26). Following counsel's objection to Mr. Ferguson's active involvement, 
Mr. Ferguson responded as follows: "It is my role, as I perceive it, to make sure that 
the facts related to the case are brought forward so that they [the Commissioners] can 
make a decision." (R. 678). 
Mr. Ferguson's self-perceived role is incorrect. It is not the role of a "legal" 
advisor to determine which facts do or do not need to be brought to the attention of the 
Commission. The Commissioners are the only proper finders of fact. Mr. Ferguson's 
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practice had the effect of emphasizing for the Commission whatever evidence Mr. 
Ferguson thought important and highlighting the witnesses Mr. Ferguson thought most 
pertinent. For instance, during Mr. Ferguson's interrogation of Officer Lucas regarding 
the propriety of re-searching Mr. Spegar, the following dialogue takes place: 
MR. FERGUSON: Did you pat down his crotch area at that 
time? 
THE WITNESS: I did not. 
MR. FERGUSON: Why not? 
THE WITNESS: I've got two men in custody, you know. 
And if I were to do that, then I'd have to give my undivided attention to 
this guy. If he clamped down on Ids legs, my hand's trapped and the 
other one turns around, they can beat the crap out of me. 
MR. FERGUSON: I think you said you'd got them both 
handcuffed. 
THE WITNESS: That's right. 
MR. FERGUSON: Why didn't you pat them down? 
THE WITNESS: As I said, it's the methods that we're 
taught. You know, just because someone is handcuffed doesn't mean 
that they can't hurt you. It's an officer safety thing. 
MR. FERGUSON: I'm concerned here. I don't mean to cut 
you off, but you said you reached into his pocket and grabbed onto 
something that was a hard object. Why is that different than patting 
down the crotch? (R. 823-24). 
This line of questioning demonstrates that Mr. Ferguson actually cross-
examined Officer Lucas on issues Mr. Ferguson apparently disbelieved or found 
bewildering. In fact, Mr. Ferguson flatly offered his opinion of Officer Lucas' 
explanation on the record: 
MR. FERGUSON: What's confusing to me as a layperson is 
why, if you thought he had a weapon, why you would let him put his 
hands anywhere near where the weapon might be, if you already had 
the opportunity with him being handcuffed to make sure he didn't have 
a weapon. (R. 824). 
Moreover, Mr. Ferguson's practice of ruling on evidentiary issues before an 
objection had been made, and without request of any Commissioner, demonstrates that 
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Mr. Ferguson was allowed to make sua sponte decisions without consulting the 
Commissioners. (See e.g. R. 575). Such participation is not consistent with the role of 
an "advisor" but demonstrates that Mr. Ferguson had nearly limitless power to influence 
the hearing. His participation was not consistent with the stringent limitation of 
commission powers, and the selection and qualification of commissioners, as outlined 
under the law. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1001 to -06. Thus, as recognized in Williams, 
this Court should rule that such acts violate the limited authority granted to the 
Commission and order a new hearing to be conducted in conformity to statutory 
guidelines. See also, Utah Gas Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 422 P.2d 530 
(Utah 1967) (party to administrative hearing entitled to full and fair hearing conducted 
in conformity with law). 
VI. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE DISCHARGE 
OF OFFICER LUCAS DESPITE THE CITY'S FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH ITS RULES 
An officer has a property interest in continued employment unless the person is 
afforded due process through established guidelines to terminate that employment. 
Worrall v. Qgden City Fire Dept. 616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980). Thus, an officer has 
an interest in the procedural protections codified by a municipality to prevent unjust 
termination. See id. at 602. 
The uncontroverted facts demonstrated that the City violated its own written 
policies during its investigation of Officer Lucas. (R. at 707-17). These violations 
obligated the Commission to set aside the discipline. "In an analysis of a procedure, an 
important factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the 
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards." 
Worrall 616 P.2d at 602. Because the City admittedly did not provide Officer Lucas 
with the procedures implemented to ensure fair treatment in disciplinary proceedings, 
this Court must reverse the Commission's decision and order that Officer Lucas be 
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reinstated. See also, Anderson, 748 P.2d at 55 (ordering reinstatement of fired officer 
for failing to follow department procedures). 
During cross-examination, Lt. Fondaco admitted to the following: 
(1) The internal affairs investigation of Officer Lucas lasted more 
than 30 days and that Murray City Policy and Procedure requires 
such investigations to be completed within 30 days (R. 707-9); 
(2) Officer Lucas was never informed at any time that the internal 
affairs investigation against him had been changed from one of 
excessive force to one of dishonesty (R. 710); 
(3) Officer Lucas had not been provided with a written statement of 
the charges against him before he was interrogated by Lt. 
Fondaco (R. 709-10); 
(4) The failure to notify Officer Lucas of the original charge against 
him (excessive force) and that the investigation had changed to 
one of dishonesty were both violations of City policy (R. 710-
13); and 
(5) Lt. Fondaco never contacted the Utah Attorney General's Office 
or any other investigative authority regarding the internal affairs 
investigation of excessive force as indicated by City policy (R. 
716-17). 
The Murray City Police Department has adopted Policy 555, III which contains 
the following relevant language: 
(E) Internal Affairs investigations will be completed within thirty 
(30) days with status reporting done every seven (7) days. 
Extensions will be authorized by the Chief of Police in those 
cases where extenuating circumstances exist. 
* * * * 
(G) Prior to any interview of an accused member as part of an 
Internal Affairs Investigation, the member will be given written 
notification of the allegations, and their rights and responsibilities 
relative to the investigation. 
The uncontroverted evidence presented to the Commission demonstrated that 
the City violated its own policies. However, the Commission's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law do not even address these procedural errors. This is an abuse of 
discretion which warrants reversal of the Commission's decision, and immediate 
reinstatement of Officer Lucas with full back pay. The failure by the Commission to 
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even address the issue raised by Officer Lucas is "an abuse of discretion" since "at a 
minimum, the [Commission] should have addressed [Lucas'] legal contentions in its 
findings and conclusions." Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31-2. As a result, Officer Lucas was 
denied the due process ofafiill and fair hearing. Id. Thus, upholding the termination of 
Officer Lucas' employment in light of these procedural deficiencies was an abuse of 
discretion, and failing to even mention the errors or their effect in its findings was a 
further abuse of discretion. Either deficiency alone warrants reversal; together reversal 
is mandated. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's decision to uphold Murray City's termination of 
Officer Lucas' employment must be set aside. First and foremost, this Court should 
substitute its own interpretation of the evidence since the Commission's decision could 
not reasonably have been based on the evidence and lacked substantial support. Thus, 
the Court should order Murray City to reinstate Officer Lucas with back pay. The Court 
should also order the City to reinstate Officer Lucas with back pay since the City 
admittedly did not follow its own policies in terminating his employment. 
Alternatively, the Court should remand the case back to the Commission 
and order a new hearing based upon the Commission's erroneous rulings which 
prevented Officer Lucas from: (a) presenting evidence that he was terminated in 
retaliation for participating in an Attorney General's investigation of Lt. Fondaco and 
the Murray City Police Department; (b) examining the bias of witnesses against him; 
and (c) introducing a tape recording of his accuser's partial retraction of his story. 
Finally, the Court should remand the case for a new hearing due to the Commission's 
decision to allow its "legal advisor" to interrogate witnesses, make sua sponte rulings, 
and offer fact opinions on the record. 
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us I DATED thi I day of March, 1997 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
By. 
B^yon J. Bendvento 
D. Matthew Moscon 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the within 
and foregoing Brief of Officer Lucas to be hand-delivered, this / day of March, 1997, 
to the following: 
Craig Hall, Esq. 
Murray City Attorney's Office 
5025 South State Street 
Murray City, Utah 84157-0520 
Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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1. PETITIONER'S PROFFER OF EVIDENCE 
2. ORDER EXCLUDING RETALIATION EVIDENCE 
3. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
4. MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION'S RULES AND 
REGULATIONS (RELEVANT SECTIONS) 
5. MURRAY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY 555, III 
6. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
7. TRANSCRIPTS OF CRITICAL PORTIONS OF HEARING RECORD 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Bryon J. Benevento (5254) 
D. Matthew Moscon (6947) 
Attorneys for Grievant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
MURRAY CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
In the Matter of Officer 
EDWARD J. LUCAS, 
Grievant, 
PROFFER OF TESTIMONY 
The grievant, Edward J. Lucas ("Officer Lucas"), 
hereby proffers the following testimony of witnesses he may 
call to testify regarding his claim of retaliatory discharge. 
This proffer is being made in accordance with the Commission's 
oral order of October 14, 1996. 
ROBERT EVANS 
Robert Evans was employed with the Murray City Police 
Department from 1985 to 1994. He is currently employed as a 
district agent with the Adult Probation and Parole Office for 
the Department of Corrections, State of Utah. 
IU 
Mr. Evans will testify that Lt. Fondaco would 
routinely direct police officers to obtain vehicle repair 
quotes from various auto repair shops and then present those 
bids to AFC Auto Body Shop. The owner, Larry Cvitkovich, would 
then underbid the other quotes. Mr. Evans will testify that he 
and Officer Lucas informed Ron Barton, an investigator with the 
Attorney General's Office, about this bid rigging scheme. They 
also told Mr. Barton that Lt. Fondaco would frequently use 
excessive force against arrestees. 
Mr. Evans will testify that Ron Barton captured this 
bid rigging scheme on videotape and characterized it as a 
"heinous anti-trust violation." 
Mr. Evans will testify that Chief Kenneth Killian 
pressured the Attorney General's Office to cease its 
investigation, and insisted that he be given the names of the 
officers who made the complaints. 
Mr. Evans was called by Randy Richins and told that 
Chief Killian recently found out that Mr. Evans and Officer 
Lucas were the individuals who reported the police corruption 
and misconduct to the Attorney General's Office. Mr. Evans was 
advised to "look out" and to "watch his back" because reprisals 
would be forthcoming. 
2 
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RON BARTON 
Ron Barton is an investigator with the Utah Attorney 
General's Office. In 1993 and 1994, Mr. Barton was assigned to 
investigate complaints of anti-trust violations. He received a 
complaint from Officer Lucas, Robert Evans and other police 
officers of the Murray City Police Department regarding police 
corruption and misconduct. 
Mr. Barton will testify that Officer Lucas complained 
of Lt. Fondaco's use of excessive force and a bid rigging 
scheme. He will testify that the bidding scheme involved Lt. 
Fondaco instructing officers of the Murray City Police 
Department to take their vehicles to AFC Auto Body Shop for 
repair. The owner of AFC Auto Body Shop, Larry Cvitkovich, 
would examine the bids from other auto body shops and then 
underbid those quotes. 
Mr. Barton will testify that he was about to 
investigate whether Lt. Fondaco was receiving any "kick-backs" 
when his supervisor told him to stop his investigation. Chief 
Kenneth Killian was infuriated with Mr. Barton's investigation 
and demanded that the entire matter be turned over to the 
Murray City Attorney's Office. Chief Killian also demanded to 
know the names of the officers who had complained. Chief 
Killian stated that he felt betrayed by these officers and was 
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d i s a p p o i n t e d t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t b r i n g t h e i r c o m p l a i n t s t o h im 
r>prr-:r,nV ": \ r . I (hen t h " a t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e i n f o r m e d t h e 
C h i e f t h a t n j o u l d .. . ; - - ' - *" " " ° / 
C h i e f K i l l i a n s a i d " I know who t h e o f f i c e r s a r e a n y w a y . " 
EDWARD LUCAS 
O f f i c e r L u c a s * r . e s t i f y :,;:a, . • ..^ ..? 
U t a h A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e r e g a r d i n g L t . F o n d a c c s u s e of 
ex^ <=» - : r c: -. .-- ?< r ~4 - s c h e m e of b i d r i q g i n g . O f f i c e r L u c a s 
w i l l t e s t i f y . n a t Mi . B a r t o n t u r n e d I lie m a : ; n - 3 
M u r r a y C i t y A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
of1 •••<=•.* r : -;as w.:1] *- 3 s t i f v t h a t a few m o n t h s a g o h e 
r e c e i v e d t e l e p h o n e : a a. I s 1 1 ~ ^ ~-.~ , j h i n s a :i :i :I R o b e r t E v ai is 
M e s s r s . R i c h i n s a n d E v a n s i n f o r m e d O f f i c e r L u c a s t o " w a t c h h i s 
b a c k " I: Eicai i s i n : i : a y C:i t/; r P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t h a d r e c e n t l y 
d i s c o v e r e d t h a t O l t i c e r L u c a s was o n e o t the1 i n d j w i Mii.4 I s win 
c o m p l a i n e d tc . h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e . 
RANDY RICHINS 
R a n d y R i c h i n s i s e m p l o y e d ryy
 L.. .. 
C o r r e c t i o n s f o r t h e S t a t e o f U t a h . Mr. R i c h i n s VJI.1I t e s t i f y 
t - o f f i c e r s 1 of t h e M u r r a y CxLy P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t t o l d 
1The two o f f i ce r s have asked tha t t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s be kept conf ident ia l 
because they are s t i l l employed with the Murray City Police Department and are 
concerned about r e t a l i a t i o n . If the Commission requ i res the o f f i c e r s to come 
forward, Officer Lucas reques ts t ha t the proceedings be closed, the t r a n s c r i p t 
sealed, anyone employed with the Police Department be excluded during t h e i r 
testimony, the Murray City At to rney ' s Office be ordered to keep the o f f i c e r s ' 
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him that the Police Department "finally discovered" that Robert 
Evans and Edward Lucas were the ones who complained " o the Utah 
Attorney General' s Office aboi it 1:1 i€ g : ] i :: 
misconduct. Mr. Richins will testify that he called Messrs. 
Fvar.- •-. -'' Lucas to inform them of the disclosure, and to warn 
them L ^ expect reprisals. 
OFFICERS JOHN DOES 
Off±cers J^hn Does are employed with *"he Murray Cit 
PoAAv:c ^epartment-
command levei officers of the Murray City Police Department 
(=.
 A *-. ^  <* - -. • ;- i c e r v ~ -.=:.. ~ n d Robe r t Evan s we re *- h ^ 
-ridJ.vi.a^.^-^ • .:, co m p i a m e a 
about the police corruption and misconduct '": ..estil 
-G:veved this information to Randy Richins of the 
Department ot Corrections. 
Officers John Does will testify that they are 
extreme] y concerned of retaliation f^ -on the Dolice Department 
:i f theii iae;, -, ties are Giscuvii.^'i, ^ ^  
Fondaco and Cnief Killian have signed affidavits that they were 
identities strictly confidential, and that the logistics of the officers' 
testimony be handled in such a way that their identities are not discovered 
(e.g., the officers should not be summoned to testify at the Murray City Hall 
where everyone knows them). 
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unaware of Officer Lucas' involvement in the Attorney General's 
DATED this *" day -Lober, 1996 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
C7^ 
By: \ ' *^7*~ 
y5n J-r^gi 
BrySn J:*~13$tfieve 
At to rneys for Grievan 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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copy of the wiIhin and foregoing PROFFER OF TESTIMONY to 
hand-delivered this £' day of October, 1996, 
H. Craig Hall, Esq. 
Murray City Attorney 
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MURRAY CITY CORPORATION 
EDWARD J. LUCAS 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
CAMF Ofl TO flF I III IBR Minin* f .il i i| ml i '". Mntini i Il i Ill - = 
14th day of October, 1996. The Commission having read and considered Murray City's 
r 
Memorandum in Opposition to Murray City's Motion in Limine, Officer Lucas' Proffer of 
Testimony, and Murray city's Response to proffer ot I estimony along with the Affidavit 
of Ronald Barton, and having heard argument of counsel for Murray City and for Officer 
Lucas, it is hereb; f: 
ORDERS 
that it is 
CHI III HI II II II i II II i ill Irdw.nd J II J J i ii'u In J a I lull! I1 j , .JIHI iiiiiiu II ill i nil im II 
witnesses called by Edward J. Lucas are instructed to refrain from mentioning or 
referring to, in any way, the following matters during the Civil Service Commission 
Hearing: 
(a) any 1993-1994 complaints or allegations Edward J. Lucas and/or others 
may have made to the I Jtah Attorn* potential 
corruption in the Murray City Police Department; 
(b) ai ry I ters 
may have mad< le Utah Attorney General. 
antitrust violations involving vehicle repairs in the Murray City Police Department; 
• -) any 1993-1994 complaints or allegations Edward J. Lucas and/or others 
iruv I1 "'" '" " '" In Hie I Hah Attornpv General's office against Lieutenant Pete Fondaco; 
the 1993-1994 Utah Attorney General's office investigation into the 
Murray 1 
(e) any allegation that the decision to terminate the employment of Officer 
Lucas was retaliatory in nature. 
Signed this the J^^clay of / t 7 ^ t ^ i ^ n ^ 1996. 
MURRAY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
,/ 
Rex Vance, Chairman 
2 
Tab "\ 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION 
IN THE MATTER OF 
EDWARD J. LUCAS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
On November 19, 1996 commencing at 9:00 a.m., an evidentiary 
hearing was held before the Murray City Civil Service Commission 
at the Murray City Council Chambers, 5025 South State Street, 
Murray, Utah. Petitioner Edward J. Lucas was present and 
represented by his legal counsel, Bryon J. Benevento and D. 
Matthew Moscon of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; present 
and representing Murray City were H. Craig Hall, Murray City 
Attorney, and co-counsel Cindy L. Tooms and Kenneth Killian, 
Murray City Chief of Police. Also present throughout the hearing 
were the members of the Murray City Civil Service Commission, Rex 
Vance (Chairman), Marvin Harding, Ron Smith and Dale Whittle 
(Civil Service Secretary) and Dennis C. Ferguson, legal counsel 
for the Commission. 
Prior to presentation of evidence, the Commission had before 
it a Motion filed by Murray City to disqualify Dr. Kenneth 
Rodgers, a psychologist whom petitioner intended to call as an 
expert witness. After due consideration of the parties' 
memoranda and oral argument, Murray City's Motion was denied. 
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Petitioner had also filed a Motion to disqualify Dr. Eric 
Nielsen, a psychologist, from testifying as an expert witness on 
behalf of Murray City. Murray City elected not to call Dr. 
Nielsen so petitioner's motion to disqualify him became moot. 
The parties stipulated that Exhibits 1 through 11 and 13 
through 22 could be received. Exhibit 12 was later received 
without objection. The Commission heard live testimony from 
Marty Spegar, Dustin Garcia, Officer Chris Snow, Lieutenant Pete 
Fondaco, Police Chief Ken Killian, Dr. Kenneth Rodgers and 
petitioner Ed Lucas. 
WHEREFORE, having heard and considered the evidence and 
argument presented and being fully advised, Murray City Civil 
Service Commission hereby makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about June 10, 1996 Lieutenant Dee Rowland of the 
Murray City Police Department, received by telephone a complaint 
from Lieutenant Bill Garcia of the Utah Department of Public 
Safety, whose son Dustin Garcia had been arrested for automobile 
burglary along with Martin Spegar on or about May 27, 1996 
(Exhibit 1). Subsequently, a written statement from Marty Spegar 
(Exhibit 2) was forwarded to the Murray City Police Department 
and the allegation of excessive force against Office Ed Lucas was 
assigned to Lieutenant Pete Fondaco for investigation. 
- 2 - 2 I 8 
2. The gist of Mr. Spegar's allegation against Officer 
Lucas was that he had unnecessarily removed his service revolver 
from his holster during a search of Mr. Spegar that occurred at 
the Murray City Police Department and that Officer Lucas had 
pointed the revolver at Mr. Spegar and threatened him. 
3. Officer Lucas was questioned by Lieutenant Fondaco 
about the incident on June 12, 1996. At that time, Lieutenant 
Fondaco read the written statement of Marty Spegar to Officer 
Lucas and asked him whether any of the allegations were true. 
Officer Lucas replied that Mr. Spegar placed his hand in his 
crotch area and Officer Lucas responded by unsnapping his gun, 
putting Spegar up against the wall and searching him. Officer 
Lucas unequivocally denied ever pulling his gun from his holster 
and denied pointing the weapon at Mr. Spegar's head. 
4. Subsequent to Lieutenant Fondaco's interview with 
Officer Lucas, Officer Chris Snow came forward with information 
that he had observed Officer Lucas standing by Spegar's side with 
his service revolver drawn and at the "low ready" position. 
5. Officer Lucas testified that he had conducted a pat 
down search of Martin Spegar at the time he apprehended him at 
the scene. This search included a pat down of Mr. Spegar's 
crotch area; no weapon was discovered or suspected at that time. 
Officer Lucas did feel a "hard object" inside of Mr. Spegar's 
pants pocket and admits that he attempted to remove this object, 
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but it appeared to cause Mr. Spegar some pain, so Officer Lucas 
abandoned his efforts to remove it at that time. Mr. Spegar 
testified that this object (a pair of pliers) together with a 
small flashlight and his keys were removed at the scene and 
replaced back into his pockets. 
6. During a subsequent interview with Polygrapher Vern 
Peterson and subsequent to Officer Lucas learning of Officer 
Snow's testimony, Officer Lucas described the incident as 
follows: 
They (Spegar's pants) were loose enough 
where he could get both his hands into it 
(the crotch area), and even go on from there 
obviously. So I stepped back, had one had HAMp 
up, unsnapped my weapon and was leaning 
forward pushing him aside. My gun was 
unsnapped, my hand was on it, and it was 
obviously two or three inches outside the 
leather. It was pointed down, and I told him 
get your God-damned hands out of your pants. 
7. At the hearing, Officer Lucas testified that he did not 
unholster his weapon, but that he unsnapped it twice. 
8. Officer Lucas defends his conduct by claiming that his 
statements have been consistent. Alternatively, he claims that 
he was under stress and in fear of bodily injury, experienced 
tunnel vision, and if he did draw his gun, he can't remember. 
9. The Commission finds that Officer Lucas' statements 
regarding the holstering and unholstering of his weapon to be 
inconsistent and not credible. Officer Lucas has alternatively 
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testified that he thought Spegar may have had sharp objects in 
his pocket, such as drug paraphernalia and/or that he had a 
weapon in his crotch area. The Commission does not find this 
testimony credible given the testimony of Officer Snow that none 
of the suspects appeared to be under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, and that Spegar had been, at all times, cooperative 
during the course of the apprehension and interrogation and had 
made no threatening gestures. Officer Lucas also had ample 
opportunity to satisfy himself that the suspect did not have a 
weapon. The Commission does not find credible Officer Lucas7 
testimony that he cannot remember whether his weapon was 
holstered or unholstered. Indeed, he testified in great detail 
about his recollection of the weapon and did not indicate during 
the course of his testimony that he could not remember what 
occurred in the interrogation room. Additionally, Officer Lucas 
testified that when he apprehended Spegar at the scene of the 
crime and was concerned that Spegar might have a weapon, he drew 
down and yelled at him words to the effect that he would "blow 
his brains out" if he didn't stop. Thus, it would have been 
perfectly believable had Officer Lucas in the station room 
believed that Spegar was going for a weapon to have done the same 
thing. Clearly, Officer Lucas' statements regarding what 
occurred in the interrogation room and the details of the 
incident offered by Officer Lucas changed substantially in 
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subsequent interviews from the statement initially given to 
Lieutenant Fondaco. Under these circumstances, the Commission 
finds that Chief Killian was reasonable in interpreting Officer 
Lucas7 statements as inconsistent and untruthful. Finally, the 
Commission finds that whether Officer Lucas' service weapon was 
holstered or unholstered is not a trivial matter as urged by 
Officer Lucas and his counsel. Murray City has every right to 
expect that its officers will know whether their weapons have 
been unholstered and to expect honest reporting of such 
incidents. 
Based upon these Findings of Fact, the Commission enters the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Murray City Police Department was justified in 
investigating a citizen report of excessive force. 
2. During the course of the excessive force investigation, 
Lieutenant Fondaco reasonably suspected that Officer Lucas had 
been less than candid with him in providing facts relating to his 
conduct in the interrogation room with Mr. Spegar. 
3. Subsequent statements by Officer lucas were 
inconsistent and Lieutenant Fondaco and Chief Killian were 
justified in concluding that Officer Lucas had been untruthful. 
4. Trust and honesty are essential to the good order and 
discipline of a police force. 
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5. While discharge, under the circumstances of this case, 
is a harsh punishment, the Police Chief must have complete 
confidence in the honesty and integrity of his officers and the 
Commission finds that it is not an abuse of his discretionary 
powers to have terminated Officer Lucas' employment for reasons 
of dishonesty. 
DATED this ^"7 day of November, 1996. 
MURRAY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
-^ s 
Rex Vance, Chairman 
'JMMVIJ $aM/jU*d*iA4 
Marvin Hardinc 
./£-&&. 
Ron Smith 
Approved as to form: 
e L. Whittle, Secretary 
LIMA. v_ 
Dennis C. Fergusoh, iJegal Advisor 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION 
IN THE MATTER OF 
EDWARD J. LUCAS 
RULING 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions entered by 
the Murray City Civil Service Commission, the appeal of Officer 
Ed Lucas is hereby denied and the disciplinary action imposed by 
Kenneth Killian, Murray City Police Chief, is hereby affirmed. 
DATED this "2 •? day of November, 1996. 
MURRAY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
Rex Vance, Chairman 
Marvin Harding / \ 7 
Ron Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered and served by 
facsimile/mail respectively the 2nd of December, 1996 to the following: 
H. Craig Hall 
Murray City Corporation 
5025 South State 
Murray Utah 84157 
Police Chief Kenneth Killian 
Murray City Corporation 
5025 South Stae 
Murray Utah 84157 
Bryon J. Benevento 
D. Matthew Moscon 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0450 
Edward J. Lucas 
3290 East Emigration Canyon 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84108 
Dale L. Whittle 
Secretary 
Murray City Civil Service Commission 
December 2, 1996 
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MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(Revised Edition) 
Adopted pursuant to Section 10-3-1006 Utah Code Annotated 
19 53, as amended 
COMMISSIONERS 
REX VANCE 
RON SMITH 
MARVIN HARDING 
July 1, 1996 
Section 3 
COMMISSION 
3-1. Organization -- Quorum. The Civil Service Commission shall 
consist of three members appointed by the Mayor with the advice 
and consent of the Municipal Council. One of the three shall be 
designated chairperson, who shall preside at all meetings of the 
Commission. For the purpose of the transaction of business, two 
members shall constitute a quorum. Each member shall be appointed 
to a term of six years, such terms expiring on the 3 0th day of 
June of an even-numbered year. One member's term shall expire 
each even-numbered year. 
3-2. Meetings. The Commission shall meet from time to time at 
the place designated on the call of the Secretary at the direction 
of the Chairperson or any two members of the Commission. Such 
meetings will be scheduled and agendas posted in accordance with 
Section 52-4-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
3-3. Secretary to the Commission. An individual shall be 
appointed to serve as secretary to the Commission. It shall be 
the duty of the secretary to keep a minute book containing minutes 
of all meetings of the Commission. The minutes, after approval, 
shall be public records. 
3-4. Powers and Duties. The Commission or the Commission 
Secretary shall have prime responsibility for: 
a. Reviewing appointments and proposed new positions to assure 
compliance with established civil service rules and 
regulations. 
b. Preparing examinations and establishing registers of 
eligible candidates for civil service positions. 
c. Certifying names from established civil service registers 
in compliance with the civil service rules and regulations 
to the appointive power or department head. 
d. Recommending needed policy changes for the approval of the 
Mayor. 
e. Maintaining central civil service records. 
f. Serving as an Appeals Board for civil service employees 
who appeal action taken by the appointive power and/or 
Mayor. 
3-5. Citizens Complaints. Any citizen may make complaint in 
writing to the department head of any violation of duty by any 
employee in the civil service, whereupon the department head 
may in his/her discretion, investigate such complaint and take 
such action as he/she deems necessary. Complaints which cannot 
be satisfied in this manner may be submitted to the Mayor for 
appropriate action and, if not then satisfied, the citizen may 
appeal to the Commission. The Commission may, in its 
discretion, investigate such complaint and may require such 
citizen to appear in person at a hearing to be conducted by it 
of the person accused. Upon such hearing the Commission shall 
determine whether the charges in such complaint have been 
sustained, and may recommend to the Mayor such punishment by 
discharge, suspension, or otherwise, as in its judgment may be 
deemed proper under the circumstances. 
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Section 11 
DISCIPLINARY RESPONSIBILITY, GROUNDS AND ORDER 
11-1. Responsibility for Discipline. Basic responsibility for 
discipline is vested in the appointing power of each department 
and not in either the Civil Service Commission or the Mayor. 
Progressive discipline which normally involves a verbal reprimand, 
written reprimand, suspension and termination shall be 
administered fairly and consistently by the appointing power. 
Severity of the offense will determine the steps required for 
progressive discipline. In cases where the appointing power does 
not assume responsibility for exercise of this power the 
Commission, in the public interest, may investigate and recommend 
appropriate action, and the Mayor may remove the appointing power 
as he deems necessary. 
11-2. Uniform Penalties. In making demotions or removals, or 
imposing penalties for delinquency or misconduct, penalties like 
in character shall be imposed for like offenses. 
11-3. Misconduct. The following misconduct may be grounds for 
suspension or other disciplinary action: 
a. Chargeable accident. 
b. Using profane or blasphemous language. 
c. Displaying bad or ungovernable temper. 
d. Lack of promptness in execution of duties. 
e. Neglect of duty or absence from Post of Duty without leave 
from proper authority 
f. Uncivil or discourteous attitude toward citizens or 
superior officers. 
g. Lounging or idling on duty. 
h. Tardiness (excessive and unexcused). 
i. Lack of unexcused and excessive neatness in person or 
dress, reasonably compatible with position held. 
j. The commitment of any crime relating to public morals and 
decency, or drunkenness, or violation of the liquor laws, 
or other laws involving moral turpitude . 
k. Violation of any City ordinance or State statute, whether 
or not a formal criminal charge is filed, or of the 
adopted rules and regulations of the Civil Service 
Commission or of the department wherein employed, relating 
to the conduct and authority of the employees. 
1. Untruthfulness or dishonesty. 
m. Failure to observe applicable administrative rules. 
n. Misuse of city property or equipment. 
o. Using or uttering disrespectful language about or 
concerning a fellow officer or employee. Making derogatory 
remarks about other members of his department either to 
members of his department or to anyone outside of the 
department, provided he may do so to his superior, the 
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13-6. Extension of Time, Amendments and Subpoenas. For good 
cause shown upon written petition duly filed and served on the 
adverse party or on its own motion, the commission may make s_.cn 
orders as it deems necessary, extending the time limit by these 
rules within which any party shall be required to act, except for 
time within which to appeal, and may require or permit amendments 
to pleadings, require and provide for bills of particular, the 
taking of depositions, the preservation of evidence, the subpoe-
naing of witnesses and such other matters or things it deems 
necessary and in the best interest of the parties, the public, and 
for the full hearing and determination of the matter. 
13-7. Default of the Parties. Upon the failure of either party 
to appear and defend or prosecute the action, the Commission may 
make its own investigation and determination of the matter and 
enter its orders in accordance therewith. 
13-8. Service on Counsel. Where parties are represented by an 
attorney, service of any paper, pleading or notice, provided by in 
these rules may be made upon the representative of either party 
and shall constitute service on the party. 
13-9. Hearing. The hearing of said matter shall be at a time, 
place and day fixed by the Commission, before all the members of 
the Commission or a majority thereof or before a member of the 
Commission who may be delegated to hear the same. The parties may 
appear in person or may be represented by a member of the Utah 
State Bar. The Commission shall determine at the hearing the mode 
and procedure to be followed which as nearly as it may deem 
practicable will follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
13-10. Admissibility of Evidence. At all hearings the Commis-
sion will determine the admissibility of evidence and shall use as 
near as it deems practicable the rules of evidence followed in the 
Courts in this State. 
13-11. Oath of Witnesses. Every witness in a hearing before 
the commission shall first be sworn to testify truthfully as 
provided by law. The oath shall be administered by a member of 
the Commission. 
13-12. Determination from the Record. Where the hearing of any 
matter is before less than all the members of the Commission, 
final determination thereof shall be made by the Commission from 
the files, records and abstracts of the testimony introduced at 
said hearing. 
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Murray City Police Department 
Policies and Procedures 
P. Receiving or accepting money or anything ot value for special fa\ors 
to persons or individuals in connection with official duty. (Section 
400) 
Q. Willfully disobeying the lawful orders of a superior officer or 
supervisor. (Section 400) 
R. Any other misconduct, inefficiency or dereliction. (Section 400) 
555 Internal Affairs 
I. Purpose: The internal affairs function exists for the purpose of insuring the 
integrity of the Murray Police Department, through an internal process 
where objectivity, fairness, and justice are assured by intensive, impartial 
investigation and review. 
II. Internal Affairs Unit Responsibilities: It is the responsibility of the internal 
affairs unit to record and control the investigation of complaints against 
members, supervise and control the investigation of alleged or suspected 
misconduct within the Murray Police Department, and maintain the 
confidentiality of internal affairs investigations and records. 
A. The internal affairs unit is supervised by the Chief of Police. 
B. Pursuant to requirements of this policy, the Internal Affairs Unit will 
be notified of all complaints against members for: 
1. Criminal misconduct 
2. Excessive use of force 
3. Corruption 
4. Breach of Civil Rights 
5. Policy and procedure violations 
C. Line supervisors are responsible for the investigation of policy and 
procedure violations which, if sustained, would normally result in 
minor discipline. All other complaints will be investigated by or 
5.8 
Murray City Police Department 
Policies and Procedures 
under the direction of Internal Affairs. Internal Affairs will 
investigate or assist in investigating any complaint at the direction of 
the Chief of Police or at the request of any Division Commander. 
III. Complaint Processing 
A. All complaints will be investigated. As appropriate, the extent of 
the investigation may be limited to substantiating falsity of 
accusations. 
B. Investigations will be conducted using such investigatory actions, 
techniques and resources as are appropriately consistent with other 
provisions of the Murray Police Department Rules and Regulations 
Polices and Procedures Manual. 
C. Investigations will be fully documented, including the investigatory 
actions, facts determined, and disposition of the complaint. Such 
record will be maintained in a secure area by Internal Affairs 
investigator. 
D. Complainants may be periodically advised of the general status and 
investigation by the Internal Affairs Unit. 
E. Internal Affairs investigations will be completed within thirty (30) 
days with status reporting done every seven (7) days. Extensions will 
be authorized by the Chief of Police in those cases where 
extenuating circumstances exist. 
F. As appropriate, Internal Affairs may seek legal advice and assistance 
in case preparation from the City Attorney's Office. All alleged 
criminal conduct will be reviewed with the Murray City Attorney's 
Office or Salt Lake County Attorney's Office or Utah Attorney 
General's Office. 
G. Prior to any interview of an accused member as part of an Internal 
Affairs investigation, the member will be given written notification 
of the allegations, and their rights and responsibilities relative to the 
investigation. 
5.9 
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Art. XI, § 5 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 5. [Municipal corporations — To be created by gen-
eral law — Right and manner of adopting charter 
for own government — Powers included.] 
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws. 
The legislature by general laws shall provide for the incorporation, organiza-
tion and classification of cities and towns in proportion to population, which 
laws may be altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated city or town may 
frame and adopt a charter for its own government in the following manner: 
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members, 
and upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all 
votes cast at the next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall 
forthwith provide by ordinance for the submission to the electors of the ques-
tion: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?" The ordinance shall 
require that the question be submitted to the electors at the next regular 
municipal election. The ballot containing such question shall also contain the 
names of candidates for members of the proposed commission, but without 
party designation. Such candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as 
required by law for nomination of city officers. If a majority of the electors 
voting on the question of choosing a commission shall vote in the affirmative, 
then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority of the votes cast at such 
election, shall constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame a 
charter. 
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city 
at an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission, 
which shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its completion and 
distribution among the electors and not more than one year from such date. 
Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon separately. 
The commission shall make provisions for the distribution of copies of the 
proposed charter and of any alternative provisions to the qualified electors of 
the city, not less than sixty days before the election at which it is voted upon. 
Such proposed charter and such alternative provisions as are approved by a 
majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become an organic law of such 
city at such time as may be fixed therein, and shall supersede any existing 
charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of such city 
which are now in conflict therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a 
copy of such charter as adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and 
authenticated by the seal of such city, shall be made in duplicate and depos-
ited, one in the office of the secretary of State and the other in the office of the 
city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such char-
ter. 
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a char-
ter commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters, or 
may be proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote 
thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a number equal to fifteen per 
cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding election, and any 
such amendment may be submitted at the next regular municipal election, 
and having been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon, shall 
become part of the charter at the time fixed in such amendment and shall be 
certified and filed as provided in case of charters. 
208 
COUNTIES, CITIES AND TOWNS A r t . XI , § 5 
Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby 
granted, the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and 
to adopt and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regu-
lations not in conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers in 
this constitution or any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general 
grant of authority hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not 
include the power to regulate public utilities, not municipally owned, if any 
such regulation of public utilities is provided for by general law, nor be 
deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature in matters relating to 
State affairs, to enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of the State. 
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the 
following: 
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the 
limits prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special assess-
ments for benefits conferred. 
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct, 
own, maintain and operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and 
use; to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the 
corporate limits, property necessary for any such purposes, subject to 
restrictions imposed by general law for the protection of other communi-
ties; and to grant local public utility franchises and within its powers 
regulate the exercise thereof. 
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemna-
tion, or otherwise, property within its corporate limits necessary for such 
improvements; and also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for 
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess property with 
restrictions, in order to protect and preserve the improvement. 
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property, 
or of any public utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or 
both, including, in the case of public utility, a franchise stating the terms 
upon which, in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may operate such util-
ity. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed word 
"that" in Subsection (c) of the last paragraph 
appeared in this section as published in the 
Revised Statutes of 1933. 
Cross-References. — Incorporation of cities 
and towns, § 10-2-101 et seq. 
ANALYSIS 
Classification of cities. 
Debt limit. 
Improvement districts. 
Initiated ordinance. 
Legislative power. 
Mass transportation system. 
Municipal power. 
Ordinance licensing nonprofit clubs. 
Police power. 
Power versus right to operate public utility. 
Local improvements, § 10-7-20. 
Miscellaneous powers of cities and towns, 
§ 10-1-202. 
Municipal Code, home rule exceptions to, 
§§ 10-1-106, 10-3-818. 
Powers and duties of all cities, § 10-8-1 et 
seq. 
Repeal of council-manager charter of city. 
Sewage disposal. 
Water conservancy districts. 
Withholding tax provision. 
Cited. 
Classification of cities. 
The power of the legislature to classify cities 
according to population is expressly conferred 
by this section, and statute passed to enable 
cities of first class to meet needs and require-
ments of larger municipalities was general, in 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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10-3-1001 CITIES AND TOWNS 
PART 10 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
10-3-1001. Subordinates in police, health, and fire depart, 
ments to be appointed from list. 
The head of each of the police and fire departments of cities of the first and 
second class and the health officer in cities of the first class shall, by and with 
the advice and consent of the board of city commissioners, and subject to the 
rules and regulations of the civil service commission, appoint from the 
classified civil service list furnished by the civil service commission all 
subordinate officers, employees, members or agents in his department, and in 
like manner fill all vacancies in the same. 
History: C. 1953,10-3-1001, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Accountability of officers. power of his appointment and removal from 
A police officer is responsible only to the head office. Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 
of his department, to whom has been given the 1128 (1936). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Service C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 
§ 1 et seq. §§ 570 to 572, 602, 603, 653, 654, 711 to 717. 
10-3-1002. Classified civil service — Employment consti-
tuting. 
The classified civil service shall consist of all places of employment now 
existing or hereafter created in or under the police department and the fire 
department of each city of the first and second class, and the health depart-
ment in cities of the first class, except the head of the departments, deputy 
chiefs of the police and fire departments and assistant chiefs of the police 
department in cities of the first and second class, and the members of the board 
of health of the departments. No appointments to any of the places of 
employment constituting the classified civil service in the departments shall be 
made except according to law and under the rules and regulations of the Civil 
Service Commission. The head of each of the departments may, and the deputy 
chiefs of the police and fire departments and assistant chiefs of the police 
department shall, be appointed from the classified civil service, and upon the 
expiration of his term or upon the appointment of a successor shall be returned 
thereto. 
History: C. 1953,10-3-1002, enacted by L. 1-115, has been revised to incorporate the 
1977, ch. 48, § 3; 1977, ch. 44, § 1. amendment of § 10-10-10 by Laws 1977, ch. 44, 
Compiler's Notes. — This section is derived § 1. 
from former § 10-10-10 and, pursuant to § 10-
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
QJJS. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations Validity, under Federal Constitution, of regu-
*$ 570 to 572, 602, 603, 653, 654, 711 to 717. lations, rules, or statutes requiring random or 
AXJ*- — Determination as to good faith in mass drug testing of public employees or per-
abolition of public office or employment subject sons whose employment is regulated by state, 
t/> civil service or merit system, 87 A.L.R.3d local, or federal government, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 
3«. 42°-
10-3-1003. Commission — Number, term, vacancies. 
In each city of the first and second class there shall be a civil service 
commission, consisting of three members appointed by the board of commis-
sioners. Their term of office shall be six years, but they shall be appointed so 
that the term of office of one member shall expire on the 30th day of June of 
each even-numbered year. If a vacancy occurs in the civil service commission, 
it shall be filled by appointment by the board of city commissioners for the 
unexpired term. 
History: C. 1953,10-3-1003, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, S 3. 
10-3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners — Salary — 
Removal. 
Not more than two members of the civil service commission shall at any one 
time be of the same political party. No member of the civil service commission 
shall during his tenure of office hold any other public office, or be a candidate 
for any other public office. Each member shall receive $25 for each meeting of 
the commission which he shall attend, but shall not receive more than $100 in 
any one month. In case of misconduct, inability or willful neglect in the 
performance of the duties of the office by any member, the member may be 
removed from office by the board of city commissioners by a majority vote of the 
entire membership, but the member shall, if he so desires, have opportunity to 
be heard in defense. 
History: C. 1953,10-3-1004, enacted by L. 1-115, has been revised to incorporate the 
1977, ch. 48, § 3; 1977, ch. 39, § 1. amendment of § 10-10-12 by Laws 1977, ch. 39, 
Compiler's Notes. — This section is derived § 1. 
from former § 10-10-12 and, pursuant to § 10-
10-3-1005. Organization of commission — Secretary — 
Offices. 
The civil service commission shall organize by selecting one of its members 
chairman, and shall appoint as secretary one of the available officers or 
employees of the city, who shall act and serve without additional compensa-
tion. The secretary shall keep a record of all meetings of the civil service 
commission and of its work and shall perform such other services as the 
commission may require, and shall have the custody of the books and records 
of the commission. The board of city commissioners shall provide suitable 
accommodations and equipment to enable the civil service commission to 
attend to its business. 
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History: C. 1963,10-3-1005, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. 
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations — Printing and distri-
bution. 
The civil service commission shall make all necessary rules and regulations 
to carry out the purposes of this part and for examinations, appointments and 
promotions. All rules and regulations shall be printed by the civil service 
commission for distribution. 
History: C. 1953,10-3-1006, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. 
10-3-1007. Examinations. 
All applicants for employment in the classified civil service shall be subject 
to examination, which shall be public, competitive and free. Examinations 
shall be held at such times and places as the civil service commission shall 
from time to time determine, and shall be for the purpose of determining the 
qualifications of applicants for positions. Examinations shall be practical and 
shall fairly test the fitness in every respect of the persons examined to 
discharge the duties of the positions to which they seek to be appointed, and 
shall include tests of physical qualifications and health. 
History: C. 1953,10-3-1007, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. 
10-3-1008. Appointments from civil service list — Proba-
tion period. 
In all cases the appointing power shall notify the civil service commission of 
each separate position to be filled, and shall fill such place by the appointment 
of one of the persons certified by the commission therefor. Such appointment 
shall be on probation, and of a character and for a period to be prescribed by 
the civil service commission. 
History: C. 1953,10-3-1008, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 
§ 714. 
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position — Num-
ber — Eligible lists, removal. 
Whenever a position in the classified civil sendee is to be filled, the civil 
service commission shall as soon as possible certify to the appointing power the 
names of five persons to fill such position from those persons having the 
highest standing in the eligible Ust but a lesser number may be certified when 
there is not the required number on the eligible Ust. If more than one position 
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78-23-15. Exemption provisions applicable in bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
No individual may exempt from the property of the estate in any bankruptcy 
proceeding the property specified in Subsection (d) of Section 522 of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act (Public Law 95-598), except as may otherwise be 
expressly permitted under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 78-23-15, enacted by L. tion 522 of Bankruptcy Reform Act, see 11 
1981, ch. I l l , § 15. U.S.C. § 522(d). 
Federal Law. — For Subsection (d) of Sec-
CHAPTER 24 
WITNESSES 
Section 
78-24-1. 
78-24-2. 
78-24-3. 
78-24-4. 
78-24-5. 
78-24-6. 
78-24-7. 
78-24-8. 
78-24-9. 
78-24-10. 
Who may be witnesses — Jury to 
judge credibility. 
Competency to be witness. 
Judge or juror may be witness — 
Procedure. 
Interpreters — Subpoena — Con-
tempt. 
Subpoena defined. 
Duty of witness served with sub-
poena. 
Liability to forfeiture and dam-
ages. 
Privileged communications. 
Duty to answer questions — Privi-
lege. 
Proceedings in aid of or supple-
Section 
78-24-11. 
78-24-12. 
78-24-13. 
78-24-14. 
78-24-15. 
78-24-16. 
78-24-17. 
78-24-18. 
78-24-19. 
mental to attachment, garnish-
ment, or execution. 
Rights of witnesses. 
Witnesses — Exempt from arrest 
in civil action. 
Unlawful arrest — Void — Dam-
ages recoverable. 
Liability of officer making arrest. 
Discharge of witness unlawfully 
arrested. 
Oaths — Who may administer. 
Form. 
Affirmation or declaration instead 
of oath allowed. 
Variance in form of swearing to 
suit witness' belief. 
78-24-1. Who may be witnesses — Jury to judge credibil-
ity. 
All persons, without exception, otherwise than as specified in this chapter, 
who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known 
their perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other 
persons who have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding are 
excluded; nor those who have been convicted of crime; nor persons on account 
of their opinions on matters of religious belief; although, in every case the 
credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, by the manner in which he 
testifies, by the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his 
character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his motives, or by contradictory 
evidence; and the jury are the exclusive judges of his credibility. 
Competency of witnesses generally, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 601. 
Jury to decide questions of fact, § 78-21-2; 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39(a). 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, hus-
band and wife competent, may not assert privi-
lege, § 77-31-22. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-24-1. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Competency of judge as witness, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 605. 
Competency of juror as witness, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 606. 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 103 
ARTICLE I. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
fllJle 101* Scope. 
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extent and 
• H the exceptions stated in Rule 1101. 
AviBory Committee Note. — Adapted Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in 
Rule 101, Uniform Rules of Evidence courts of the state including situations previ-
frg?4) Rule 1101 contains exceptions dealing ously governed by statute, except to the extent 
($L preliminary questions of fact, grand jury that specific statutory provisions are expressly 
i ^ ^ i n g s , miscellaneous judicial or quasi.ju- retained. Rule 101 also rejects Lopes v. Lopes, 
Pf^proceedings and summary contempt pro-
 3 0 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) to the 
S i g s . Rule 101 and H01 are comparabh to
 e x t e n t ^ i t pe^ts a d h o c development of 
**£
 2 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), ^ ^ o f ^ i n s i s t e n t with these 
SSept that Rule 2 made applicable other pro- ^
 o f E v i d e n c e . 
2&tt£S£SE$Z'gSg: ^!^«^Jr?!ZlB'°m-
^ d e n c e . In addition, Rule 2 of the Utah 6 8 8 R 2 f 164 (Utah 1978) that statutory^provi-
of
 ST of Evidence (1971) expressly made the 8 1 0 n s o f evidence law mconsistent with the 
B
 inapplicable to both civil and criminal pro- rvim will take precedence is rejected. 
T
^- lg Cross-References. — Evidence generally, 
c e
^ 1 0 1 adopts a general policy making the § 78-25-2 et seq.; Rule 43, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Bail hearings* Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah 
The former Utah Rules of Evidence were ap- 1977). 
rlicable to and controlling at bail hearings. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Ju-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 68. dicial Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part II, 1987 67. 
Utah L. Rev. 467. 
Rule 102. Purpose and construction. 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and develop-
ment of the law of evidence to the $nd that the truth may be ascertained and 
proceedings justly determined. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 102 is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is an adjuration 
as to the purpose of the Rules of Evidence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130. 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. 
Rule 103 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 546 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it ^ a$ 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug* 
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity 
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and Utah case law not involving constitutional 
considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is in accord 
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah 2d 
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford v. 
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability. 
Bench trial. 
Erroneous rulings. 
—Cumulative evidence. 
—Exclusion. 
—Harmless error. 
—Objection. 
—Offer of proof. 
—Substantial right or prejudice. 
—Waiver. 
Plain error. 
Purpose. 
Cited. 
Applicability. 
Adequacy under Subdivision (a)(2) of plain-
tiffs proffer of expert testimony was irrelevant 
where the trial court's exclusion of the testi-
mony was a case management decision and the 
substance of the testimony had no bearing on 
the court's decision, because the exclusion of 
testimony was not an evidentiary ruling to 
which Subdivision (a)(2) would apply. Berrett 
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992). 
Bench trial 
When a trial is to a court, the rulings on 
evidence are not of such critical moment as 
when a trial is to a jury, because it is to be 
assumed that the court has, and will use, its 
superior knowledge as to competency and the 
effect which should be given evidence. Super 
Tire Mkt., Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 
P.2d 132 (1966). 
Erroneous rulings. 
—Cumulative evidence. 
Even if refusal to admit photographs was 
error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where 
the evidence was cumulative and could have 
added nothing to defendant's case. Godesky v. 
Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
1981). Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plai^ 
error rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 
P.2d 512 (1968). 
Cross-References. — Harmless error in ad-
mission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61 
U.RC.P. 
—Exclusion. 
When evidence is excluded by the trial court, 
any error which may have resulted from such 
exclusion is cured when the substance of the 
evidence is later admitted through some other 
means. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah 
1983). 
—Harmless error. 
Where there was no likelihood that the testi-
mony in question had any substantial bearing 
on the outcome of the trial, it was not a cause 
for reversal. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). 
Admission of hearsay testimony connecting 
defendant with the crime was not prejudicial 
where there was other testimony connecting 
the defendant to the crime adduced before the 
hearsay testimony. State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d 
1342 (Utah 1982). 
The improper admission of hearsay evidence 
was harmless error where the exclusion of such 
evidence was not likely to produce a different 
result. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 
(Utah 1982). 
Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress 
certain identification evidence was not a ruling 
upon which error can be predicated where 
there was other ample evidence of the defen-
dant's culpability. State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 
753 (Utah 1985). 
Trial court's error in restricting defense 
counsel's cross-examination of the prosecu-
tion's key witness concerning bias was harm-
less, where the jury had sufficient information 
to fully appraise the witness's biases and moti-
vations. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 
1987). 
Admission of improper impeachment evi-
dence was not prejudicial error, where the tes-
timony did not bear directly on whether defen-
dant did or did not do any of the acts with 
which he was charged, and there was no indi-
cation that the testimony improperly influ-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 607 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 594 
Rule 607. Who may impeach. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including ^ 
party calling the witness. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is Amendment Notes. — The 1992 ame^ 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is similar to ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised t ^ 
Rule 20, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). rule to make the language gender-neutral 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Collateral issue. 
Ability to remember. * • *? what constitutes a collateral i ^ 
Collateral issue. u P° n w l u c h a P*** m a v n o t ** impeaxhed, a* 
Extrinsic evidence. State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977). 
Cited. Extrinsic evidence. 
Ability to remember. Extrinsic evidence relevant to issues of cred. 
It was error for the court to prevent cross- ibility is admissible. State v. Rammel, 721 P^i 
examination that probed a robbery victim's 495 (Utah 1986). 
possible inability to remember events that „ , ± m . _ x w # x . „ „ , _ _ 
might have been exculpatory. State v. Morrell, Cited m State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 
803 P.2d 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). (Utah 1977). 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a 
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthftdness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful char-
acter is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has 
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if proba-
tive of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination 
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or un-
truthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-exam-
ined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, 
does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against 
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only 
to credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivisions character testimony. See, State v. Adams, 26 
(a) and (b) are the federal rule, verbatim, and Utah 2d 377, 489 P.2d 1191 (1971). Attack 
are comparable to Rules 22 and 6, Utah Rules upon a witness's credibility by specific in-
of Evidence (1971), except to the extent that stances of character other than conviction of a 
Subdivision (a) limits such evidence to credibil- crime is inadmissible under current Utah law. 
ity for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Rule Cf. Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 
22(c), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) allowed a 1975); Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
broader attack on the character of a witness as Allowing cross-examination of a witness as to 
to truth, honesty and integrity. specific instances affecting character for truth-
This rule should be read in conjunction with fulness is new to Utah practice and in accord 
Rule 405. Subdivision (b) allows, in the discre- with the decision in Michelson v. United 
tion of the court on cross-examination, inquiry States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). The cross-exami-
into specific instances of the witness's conduct nation of a character witness as to specific in-
relative to his character for truthfulness or un- stances of conduct which the character witness 
truthfulness or specific instances of conduct of may have heard about concerning the person 
a person as to whom the witness has provided whose character is placed in evidence has been 
633 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 1101 
tiixle 1007. Testimony or written admission of party. 
Contents of writings, recordings, or photographs may be proved by the testi-
f y or deposition of the party against whom offered or by that party's writ-
J*1 admission, without accounting for the nonproduction of the original. 
f e n d e d effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
federal rule, verbatim. There was no com- ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
Arable rule in the Utah Rules of Evidence rule to make the language gender-neutral. 
/*o71), but the rule appears to be in accord 
J^fl! Utah practice. 
Utile 1008. Functions of court and jury. 
When the admissibility of other evidence of contents of writings, recordings, 
oT photographs under these rules depends upon the fulfillment of a condition 
of fact, the question whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for 
^ e court to determine in accordance with the provisions of Rule 104. How-
ever, when an issue is raised (a) whether the asserted writing ever existed, or 
(b) whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the trial is 
the original, or (c) whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the 
contents, the issue is for the trier of fact to determine as in the case of other 
issues of fact. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is the same as Rule 70(2), Utah Rules of Evidence 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantially (1971). 
ARTICLE XI. 
MISCELLANEOUS RULES. 
Rule 1101. Applicability of rules. 
(a) Courts and magistrates. These rules apply to all actions and proceed-
ings in the courts of this state except as otherwise provided in Subdivision (b). 
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do 
not apply in the following situations: 
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under 
Rule 104(a); 
(2) Grand jury proceedings; 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, sentencing or granting 
or revocation of probation, issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal sum-
monses and search warrants and proceedings with respect to release on 
bail or otherwise; 
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily; 
(5) In a preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be con-
strued to prevent the admission of reliable hearsay evidence. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is of Utah, by order dated February 23, 1994, 
substantially Rule 1101, Uniform Rules of Evi- amended this rule by adding Subdivision 
dence (1974). It departs from the Federal Rules (b)(5), effective "upon the effective date of a 
of Evidence primarily in applying the Rules of similarly worded amendment to Article I, Sec-
Evidence to preliminary examinations in crim- tion 12 of the constitution of the State of 
inal cases. Utah." The cited amendment was proposed by 
Subdivision (3) changes the rule of L. 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1, approved by the voters at 
Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah the 1994 general election, and became effective 
1977), concerning the application of the Rules on January 1, 1995. 
of Evidence to bail proceedings. Cross-References. — Grand jury, evidence 
Amendment Notes. — The Supreme Court receivable by, § 77-10a-13. 
R477-10-3 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
(5) DHRM shall provide assistance to agency 
management upon request. 
R477-10-3. E m p l o y e e D e v e l o p m e n t and Train-
ing. 
Agency management may establish a program for 
training and staff development consistent with 
these rules. 
(1) All agency sponsored training shall be agency 
specific or designed for highly specialized or techni-
cal jobs and tasks. 
(2) Agency management shall consult with the 
Executive Director, DHRM, when proposed training 
and development activities may have statewide im-
pact or may be offered more cost effectively on a 
statewide basis. The Executive Director, DHRM, 
shall determine whether DHRM will be responsible 
for the training. 
(3) The Executive Director, DHRM, shall work 
with agency management to establish principles to 
guide the development of statewide activities and to 
facilitate sharing of resources statewide. 
(4) When an agency directs an employee to par-
ticipate in an educational program, the agency shall 
pay full costs before the course begins. 
(5) Agencies are required to provide refresher 
training and make reasonable efforts to re-qualify 
veterans reemployed under USERRA, as long as it 
does not cause an undue hardship to the employing 
agency. 
R477-10-4. Educat ion Assistance. 
State agencies may assist employees in their edu-
cational goals by granting employees administrative 
leave to attend classes and/or a subsidy of educa-
tional expenses. 
(1) The following conditions shall be met for sub-
sidies of education: 
(a) The educational program will provide a benefit 
to the state. 
(b) The employee shall successfully complete the 
required course work with a passing grade. 
(c) The employee shall agree to repay any assis-
tance received if the employee voluntarily termi-
nates within 12 months of completing educational 
work. 
(d) Education assistance shall not exceed $1,500 
per employee in any one fiscal year unless approved 
in advance by the agency head. 
(2) Agency management shall be responsible for 
detennining the taxable/non-taxable s tatus of edu-
cational assistance reimbursements. 
References: 67-19-6. 
History: 10151, AMD, 09/14/89; 10811, AMD, 07/02/90; 
11817, AMD, 07/01/91; 12342, NSC, 11/27/91; 12878, AMD, 
07/01/92; 14496, AMD, 07/01/93; 15873, AMD, 07/01/94; 
16130, R&E, 10/03/94; 16928, AMD, 07/03/95; 17778, AMD, 
07/02/96. 
R477-11. Discipline. 
R477-11-1. Disciplinary Action. 
R477-11-2. Dismissal or Demotion. 
R477-11-1. D i sc ip l ina ry Act ion . 
(1) Agency management may discipline any em-
ployee for any of the following reasons: 
(a) noncompliance with these rules, agency or 
other applicable policies, including but not limited to 
safety policies, agency professional standards and 
workplace policies; 
(b) work performance tha t is inefficient or incom-
petent; 
(c) failure to maintain skills and adequate perfor-
mance levels; 
(d) insubordination or disloyalty to the orders of a 
superior; 
(e) misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or fail-
ure to advance the good of the public service; 
(f) any incident involving intimidation, physical 
harm or threats of physical harm against co-work-
ers, management, or the public. 
(2) All disciplinary actions of career service em-
ployees shall be governed by principles of due pro-
cess. In all such cases, except as provided under 
Subsection 67-19-18(4), the disciplinary process 
shall include all of the following: 
(a) The agency representative notifies the em-
ployee in writing of the proposed discipline and the 
reasons. 
(b) The employee must reply within five working 
days in order to have the agency representative 
consider the reply before discipline is imposed. 
(c) If an employee waives the right to respond or 
does not reply within the time frame established by 
the agency representative or within five days, 
whichever is longer, discipline may be imposed in 
accordance with these rules. 
(3) After a career service employee has been in-
formed of the reasons for the proposed discipline and 
has been given an opportunity to respond and be 
responded to, the agency representative may disci-
pline tha t employee, or any non-career service em-
ployee not subject to the same procedural rights, by 
imposing one or more of the following: 
(a) Written reprimand 
(b) Suspension without pay up to 30 calendar days 
per incident requiring discipline 
(c) Demotion of any employee through one of the 
following methods: 
(i) An employee may be moved from a position in 
one class to a position in another class having a 
lower entrance salary if the duties of the position 
have been reduced for disciplinary reasons. 
(ii) A demotion within the employee's current pay 
range may be accomplished by lowering the employ-
ee's salary rate back on the range, as determined by 
the agency head or designee. 
(d) Dismissal 
(i) An agency head shall dismiss or demote a 
career service employee only in accordance with the 
provision of Subsection 67-19-18(5). See R477-11-2 
of these rules. 
(e) When deciding the specific type and severity of 
the discipline to administer to any employee, the 
agency representative may consider the following 
factors: 
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(i) Consistent application of rules and standards 
(ii) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(iii) The severity of the infraction 
(iv) The repeated nature of violations 
(v) Prior disciplinary/corrective actions 
(vi) Previous oral warnings, written warnings and 
discussions 
(vii) The employee's past work record 
(viii) The effect on agency operations 
(ix) The potential of the violations for causing 
damage to persons or property. 
(4) If an agency determines t ha t a career service 
employee endangers or threatens the peace and 
safety of others or poses a grave threat to the public 
service or is charged with aggravated or repeated 
misconduct, the agency may impose the following 
actions, as provided by 67-19-18-(4), pending an 
investigation and determination of facts: 
(a) Paid administrative leave 
(b) Temporary reassignment to another position or 
work location at the same ra te of pay 
(5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed, the 
employee shall be notified in writing of the disci-
pline, the reasons for the discipline, the effective 
date and length of the discipline. 
(6) Disciplinary actions are subject to the griev-
ance and appeals procedure as provided by law for 
career service employees only. The employee and the 
agency representative may agree in writing to waive 
or extend any grievance step, or the t ime limits 
specified for any grievance step. 
R477-11-2. Dismissa l o r Demot ion . 
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for 
cause as explained under R477-10-2 and R477-11-1 
of these rules, and through the process outlined in 
this rule. 
(1) An agency head or appointing officer may 
dismiss or demote a non-career service s tatus em-
ployee without right of appeal by providing written 
notification to the employee specifying the reasons 
for the dismissal or demotion and the effective date. 
(2) No employee shall be dismissed or demoted 
from a career service position unless the agency 
head or designee has observed the Grievance Proce-
dure Rules and law cited in R137-1-13 and Title 67, 
Chapter 19a and the following procedures: 
(a) The agency head or designee shall notify the 
employee in writing of the specific reasons for the 
dismissal or demotion. 
(b) The employee shall have up to five working 
days to reply. The employee mus t reply within five 
working days for the agency representative to con-
sider the reply before discipline is imposed. 
(c) The employee shall have an opportunity to be 
heard by the agency head or designee. 
(d) Following a hearing, if the agency head finds 
adequate cause or reason, an employee may be 
dismissed or demoted. 
(3) Agency management may suspend an em-
ployee with pay pending the administrative appeal 
to the agency head. 
References: 67-19-6. 
History: 10152, AMD, 09/14/89; 10812, AMD, 07/02/90; 
10978, NSC, 10/01/90; 11818, AMD, 07/01/91; 12343, NSC, 
11/27/91; 14520, AMD, 07/15/93; 15874, AMD, 07/01/94; 
16131, R&E, 10/03/94; 16929, AMD, 07/03/95; 17148, NSC, 
09/01/95; 17779, AMD, 07/02/96. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Authorized discipline. 
—Suspension. 
Dismissal. 
Due process. 
Authorized discipline. 
—Suspension. 
Review board exceeded its authority when it overturned 
the decision of a hearing officer upholding the termination 
of a prison employee who, after a prisoner spat in his face, 
retaliated by striking the prisoner, based on a speculative 
conclusion that the employee would not have retaliated 
had he received adequate AIDS training. The board also 
exceeded its authority in substituting a fifteen-month 
suspension for the termination, as it had no authority to 
impose such a suspension, but could only impose one or 
more of the following: (a) written reprimand; (b) suspen-
sion without pay for up to thirty days per occurrence 
requiring discipline; (c) demotion; or (d) dismissal. (Former 
R665-1, R20-11.) Utah Dep't of Cors. v. Sucher, 796 R2d 
721 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Dismissal. 
Dismissal did not violate due process rights of a career 
service status public employee who pled guilty to forgery 
while holding a position of great fiduciary responsibility. It 
is not unfair or violative of employee's due process rights to 
hold him responsible for having prior knowledge that the 
commission of a forgery is a crime of moral turpitude and 
against the public policy of the state. (Former R468-11-1.) 
Kent v. Department of Emp. Sec, 860 P.2d 984 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Due process. 
Once an agency fulfills its initial burden of providing a 
factual basis for its allegations and its burden of demon-
strating that its sanction is not disproportionate, the 
employee must then raise due process concerns and/or 
rebut the agency's evidence. If the employee fails to do so, 
there is no basis on which to find that the agency's sanction 
"amounts to an abuse of discretion." Lunnen v. Utah DOT, 
886 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
R 4 7 7 - 1 2 . S e p a r a t i o n s . 
R477-12-1. Resignation. 
R477-12-2. Abandonment of Position. 
R477-12-3. Reduction in Force. 
R477-12-4. Exceptions. 
R477-12-1. Res ignat ion. 
Employees may resign by giving written or verbal 
notice to the appointing authority. In this rule, the 
word employee refers to career service employees, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
(1) Agency management may accept an employee's 
resignation without prejudice when the resignation 
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occurred? 
A No. 
Q Not a word? 
A No. 
Q Didn't laugh and joke about the 
situation? 
A The only thing that was said between us 
three -- Lt. Snow is the one that took us down there. 
I asked Lt. Snow, "What's going happen to us," if 
we're going to be in jail for three, four days. That 
was about it. I 
Q And you're positive you didn't laugh and 
joke about the situation? 
A I promise. 
Q You're as equally certain as the gun was 
drawn and pointed at you? 
A Yes. 
Q You took a polygraph examination; is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And in that polygraph examination, Vern 
Peterson asked you whether the gun was pointed at 
you; didn't he? That was one of questions he asked? 
A Yes. 
Q He didn't ask you whether it was pointed 
WENDY S. ALCOCK -- CAPITOL REPORTERS 
?73 
Page 51 
at your head but just at you; right? 
A Yes. 
Q Did he tell you what the results were? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he tell you? 
A He told me that I passed it, and the gun 
was pointed from my waist down. 
Q You're certain Vern Peterson told you you 
passed the polygraph? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And you never told Vern Peterson 
that the gun may not have been pointed at you at all, 
it could have been pointed at the floor, you just may| 
be mistaken? 
A I told him that? 
Q I'm asking: Did you? 
A I don't believe so, no, 
Q Do you know if it was tape recorded? 
A The polygraph? 
Q Yeah. 
A I'm pretty sure it was. 
Q Have you had a chance to review that tape 
with the city attorney's office? 
A No, I haven't. 
MR. BENEVENTO: If I may, I have a copy 
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of the tape here. I'd like to play just a portion to 
impeach. 
MR. FERGUSON: Not without some 
authenticity. 
MR. BENEVENTO: Can I at least play it 
and say if it's his voice? 
MR. HALL: No, I'll object. 
MR. FERGUSON: I think you've got to have 
the right witness here to lay the foundation. 
MR. BENEVENTO: Can I at least have it 
subject to recall, then? I think I'm done with this 
witness. 
MR. FERGUSON: Can't Vern Peterson 
testify that it's him on the tape? 
MR. BENEVENTO: If he's going to say that 
that's sufficient foundation, that's fine. 
MR. FERGUSON: He's there, he has 
personal knowledge as to who was in the room. 
MR. BENEVENTO: All right. 
Q (BY MR. BENEVENTO) Did you ever tell 
Vern Peterson that you now believe that your life 
wasn't threatened but rather it was just a power play| 
between you and Officer Lucas? 
A Yes. 
Q So, you didn't feel threatened, then? 
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A I did, but I don't -- I don't know. I 
feel like he had the power over me because he had a 
gun, and I'm the one who was in trouble. And I feel 
it was total power. 
Q And you told Lt. Fondaco that the gun was 
pointed at your head the whole time of you emptying 
your pockets and taking your hat off; right? 
A I don't know. 
Q You don't know now? 
A This happened so long ago. 
Q You're uncertain? 
A I'm uncertain. 
Q So, your uncertainty isn't that you're 
lying; is it? 
A No. 
Q You just can't remember? 
A All I know is that the gun was pulled 
out, that's all. 
MR. BENEVENTO: That's all I have, thank 
you. 
THE CHAIRMAN: I have two questions. 
When you were taken up to the police station, you 
said you were placed in a room? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Is that a room, rather 
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desk. 
Q How far away were you from Officer Lucas? 
A Four feet. 
Q Was there anything between you and 
Mr. Lucas which would have obstructed your vision? 
A No. 
Q When you saw the weapon pulled from the 
holster, pointed in a downward position, did that 
cause you to be concerned? 
A Not so much concern as I found it 
somewhat odd. 
Q Why? 
A I had not observed any -- it was not my 
opinion that at the time there was an officer safety 
issue. 
MR. BENEVENTO: I object on foundation. 
He indicated that he hadn't seen the incident, he was 
just merely walking by. He doesn't have foundation 
to render an opinion about safety issues in that 
room. 
MR. HALL: I think he has an opinion, he 
has the right to express his opinion whether or not 
there was an officer safety issue there when he's in 
direct proximity. 
MR. FERGUSON: Let me ask a couple 
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questions, if I can, of the witness. Had all of the 
suspects been searched prior to coming to the room? 
THE WITNESS: As I recall, not a thorough 
search. It was raining really hard when we initially 
took them into custody. And if we did any kind of 
searches, they were just a real basic pat down. Theyj 
were handcuffed. It was to make sure they didn't 
have any large weapons at the time. And so, if there 
were any searches at that time, like I said, they 
were pretty basic pat downs. 
MR. FERGUSON: When you do a pat down 
search, what are you trying to find? 
THE WITNESS: Outer clothing, we're 
looking for guns, knives. The usual ritual is to sayl 
guns, knives, shanks, grenades, anything that's going 
to hurt me. They all had coats on, and so it was 
just pat down the coats and the outer pockets, make 
sure there was nothing that was going to hurt us. 
MR. FERGUSON: So when you say you didn't 
think this was a safety issue, what are you 
thinking? What's your basis for that? 
THE WITNESS: I found it odd -- I had 
been in speaking with Mr. Spegar before, and I hadn't 
felt my -- I hadn't felt in any kind of jeopardy. 
I'd left the room, I was coming down off an 
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adrenaline, I was relatively new and caught some guys 
in the process of doing a vehicle burglary, and I was 
feeling pretty good. And I didn't feel that I was in 
any kind of jeopardy, 
MR. FERGUSON: Did you suspect that he 
might have a weapon on him at that time7 
THE WITNESS: I didn't know. I did 
observe as he was pulling things out of his pockets 
some things that might have been construed as 
weapons, like a wrench and screwdriver, a small 
flashlight, I believe. 
MR. FERGUSON: When was this? 
THE WITNESS: That's what I observed him 
taking out of his pockets. 
MR. FERGUSON: When? 
THE WITNESS: When I observed Officer 
Lucas standing in the doorway with his gun out, 
MR. FERGUSON: Okay. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Denied. I had to get it 
straight from my attorney. 
Q (BY MR. HALL) So, as you were standing 
there three or four feet away from Officer Lucas when| 
he had his service weapon pulled and pointed towards 
Mr. Spegar, in your opinion you hadn't noticed -- you 
hadn't noticed or become aware of the officer safety 
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Q And if you see the gun being pulled out, 
it's probably too late then? 
A That could be true; that's right. 
MR. BENEVENTO: Thanks. I don't have 
anything further. 
MR. HALL: I have nothing further, thank 
you. 
MR. FERGUSON: I have some questions. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. 
MR. FERGUSON: I am a little bit confused 
on procedure. It seems to me that if you are 
concerned that somebody might have a weapon, that you 
would want to do the search yourself. 
THE WITNESS: As far as? I 
MR. FERGUSON: Whether he's handcuffed 
and can't reach for a weapon. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's when I would 
do it. 
MR. FERGUSON: Before you put them in the 
automobile, wouldn't you, in terms of your procedure, 
want to believe that they were weapon free? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, that's why I stated --
that's why we did an initial pat down, to see if 
there were any weapons that would hurt me. 
MR. FERGUSON: And so --
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MR. BENEVENTO: I'm sorry, Mr, Ferguson, 
I don't want to cut you off, but I'm not aware that 
you're acting as a commissioner here. Are the 
rules --
MR. FERGUSON: It's my job to get the 
facts out. I can write questions --
MR. BENEVENTO: No, I'm just seeking a 
point of clarification, is all, Mr. Ferguson. And I 
thought that you were a legal counselor to provide 
answers to legal questions. 
MR. FERGUSON: If you want to try to 
limit my role to that, but it's my job to get facts 
out to the Commission so that they can make a 
decision. 
MR. BENEVENTO: I'm not trying to limit 
your role, I'm just seeking a point of clarification, 
Mr. Ferguson, as to whether you're to ask the 
questions or not. If it sounds like the Commission 
wants you to, then I don't have any objections. 
THE CHAIRMAN: That's true, we do. 
MR. FERGUSON: When the suspects were 
first taken to the interrogation rooms, were they 
handcuffed? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. FERGUSON: Would it have been 
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possible to search them then? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. FERGUSON: Were they searched then? 
THE WITNESS: I'm trying to recall. I 
was running between offices. I observed that Officerj 
Fernandez had searched one of the individuals. That 
prompted me to want to go back and search Mr. Garcia, 
who I had initially searched at the scene where I 
found the other screwdriver bits. And when I came 
back, that's when I observed Mr. Spegar pulling items 
out of his pocket. 
MR. FERGUSON: When you found the 
wrenches, did you keep them or did you put them — 
give them back to the suspects? 
THE WITNESS: No, I kept them. They were 
in my coat. 
MR. FERGUSON: What is your procedure in 
terms of searches? Is it normal to have the suspect 
remove things from his pocket if you believe that 
there might be a weapon in his pocket? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. FERGUSON: What is your procedure in 
that regard? 
THE WITNESS: To get them in as safe a 
position as possible, possibly handcuffed or in a 
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type of arrest position, hands behind their head, 
legs spread, that kind of thing, where I instruct 
them, "Do not grab the weapon, do not touch it, do 
not make any movement towards it or I will shoot 
you." And then retrieve the weapon myself or have 
another officer get it. 
MR. FERGUSON: Was there any indication 
that any of the suspects were under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs? 
THE WITNESS: I didn't observe that at 
the time. 
MR. FERGUSON: Did you do any testing? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. FERGUSON: When was the first time 
that you made a statement with regard to what went on 
that evening? 
THE WITNESS: I did my narrative for the 
evening, my report that evening, after we booked them| 
in jail. That's when I did the narrative in regards 
to the vehicle burglary. 
MR. FERGUSON: But there weren't any of 
these events in that report; is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. FERGUSON: When was the first time 
that you gave a statement or made a report about this 
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incident? 
THE WITNESS: After Lt. Fondaco had 
called me into his office the first time. 
MR. FERGUSON: How long after the 
incident was that? 
THE WITNESS: Like I said, I'm not sure 
of the exact time. A couple of weeks, maybe. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Do you have a question? 
MR. SMITH: I have a couple. The coats 
that the suspects were wearing, were the implements 
found in the coats or on their bodies? Were they 
big coats? 
THE WITNESS: One had a big coat, the 
other two had jackets. I believe one had kind of 
like a barn jacket that are popular now. Mr. Garcia 
-- the wrenches were found, I believe, in his coat. 
However, the screwdriver bits were found on his 
person, in his pants pocket. 
MR. SMITH: Where was Spegar's? 
THE WITNESS: He was pulling the items 
out of his pants pockets, as I recall. 
MR. SMITH: And he had a short jacket on? 
THE WITNESS: I believe so. I believe he 
was the one that had the barn jacket on. 
MR. SMITH: The other question I have 
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circumstance or potentially life-threatening 
circumstances. 
MR. HALL: Thank you. Appreciate your 
time, Doctor. 
MR. BENEVENTO: Nothing. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Doctor, we appreciate your 
time. Wait a minute, we have one question. 
MR. FERGUSON: As I understand your 
testimony, it is that when confronted with a 
potential life-threatening situation, a person reacts 
in a certain way that focuses his attention on that 
event and may make his ability to perceive other 
things that are around him not accurate. Is that --
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
MR. FERGUSON: Is that fair? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
MR. FERGUSON: That would also be true 
for both people that were in that room? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
MR. FERGUSON: The person against whom 
the gun was being drawn would have the same problem? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
MR. FERGUSON: And may not perceive the 
details as to what went on in that room as well as he 
might otherwise if he were not threatened? 
WENDY S. ALCOCK -- CAPITOL REPORTERS 
wf 
Page 154 
THE CHAIRMAN: Doctor, we appreciate you 
taking the time to come down here. Thank you, very 
much. 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
MR. FERGUSON: Before everybody goes, let 
me just put one thing on the record, because I'm 
concerned a little bit here. Brian, just so you 
know, in terms my role here, number one, I don't have 
a vote. Number two, it is not my role, never has 
been and will not be, to persuade any of the 
Commission members as to how they should vote. It is 
my role, as I perceive it, to make sure that the 
facts related to the case are brought forward so that 
they can make a decision. 
MR. BENEVENTO: I appreciate it. I just 
haven't been before a Commission that's had an 
attorney before. 
(Whereupon, lunch recess was taken.) 
THE CHAIRMAN: We are now back in 
session. Where are we? 
MR. HALL: We're at the point where we're 
going to call Lt. Pete Fondaco. 
LT. PETER FONDACO, 
called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
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A I wrote my recommendation to the Chief, 
that would be -- my report is dated July 26th. 
Q So, more than 30 days? 
A Yes . 
Q Do you know that's policy violation? 
A It's not a policy violation unless the 
extensions are not authorized by the Chief of 
Police. And, in this case, I did report to the Chief 
I would be going on vacation, so the extension was 
authorized. 
Q Where is that? Is that in writing? 
A I believe it's in the internal affairs 
section. 
Q I'll give you what they've given me on 
all internal affairs, and you can point that out to 
me where that is, that extension. 
A It's not in my report. 
Q This is all of the exhibits that 
constitute the IA file, as represented by Craig 
Hall. Can you show me where the request for 
extension is? 
A No, it's not in there. 
Q Where is it? 
A You mean officially? There is no 
written. I just have to talk to the Chief and tell 
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him; it doesn't say it has to be in writing. 
Q I see. So, you went to the Chief and 
said you needed more time? 
A I told him I was going on vacation, yes. 
Q That's not my question. You went to the 
Chief and said you needed more time? 
A Yes . 
Q When did that occur? 
A Probably around the 14th when we sat 
down. I told him that I was going on vacation. 
Q Did you notify Officer Lucas of the 
extension? 
A No, I did not. 
Q You didn't advise him that the 
investigation would not be completed within 30 days? 
A No. But Officer Lucas would know that I 
was on vacation. 
Q Yeah. He knew you were on vacation. 
Wasn't there another officer that took your place in 
conducting the investigations while you were absent? 
A Yes, Lt. Rowland interviewed two people. 
Q At the time that you did your 
investigation, I believe you said that you had 
Officer Snow and his statement before you interviewed 
Officer Lucas; is that correct? 
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A I interviewed Officer Snow prior to 
Officer Lucas? Yes• 
Q So you knew before you took Officer 
Lucas's statement that there -- that at least Officer 
Snow says the gun was out? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you, at that particular time, notify 
Officer Lucas that the subject matter of the 
investigation was dishonesty? 
A It wasn't dishonesty until he denied it. 
Q When did he deny it? 
A In my interview. 
Q That was the, what, 12th? 
A 12th. 
Q Did you prepare a revised charge and 
present that to Mr. Lucas? 
A No. 
Q Have you ever written a charge and 
presented it to Officer Lucas as to what the internal 
affairs investigation was about? 
A No. 
Q Do you know that's a violation of policy? 
A I believe he has to be notified, but I 
notified him when we were talking --
Q You don't think it needs to be in 
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writing? Are you familiar with your policy, 
Department 555, Internal Affairs? 
A Yes, it says that it needs to be in 
writing. 
Q Did you do that? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you do it when you changed the nature 
of the investigation from excessive force to 
dishonesty? 
A I never changed the nature of the 
complaint. 
Q So, we're here on an excessive force 
complaint? 
A No. I'm saying when I interviewed 
Officer Lucas, I was interviewing him -- I didn't 
make him be dishonest, I didn't change it, Officer 
Lucas did. 
Q I understand. When you interviewed 
Officer Lucas on the 12th, you told him specifically 
the nature the charge was excessive force; right? 
A In the very beginning of my statement, 
that's exactly what it was. 
MR. HALL: Bryon -- do me a favor, Bryon. 
Ask the question and give him the courtesy to give an 
answer fully and completely before you ask the next 
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question• 
MR. BENEVENTO: I thought I was. I'm 
sorry if I didn't. 
Q (BY MR. BENEVENTO) Lt. Fondaco, on the 
12th, isn't is true that when you first started to 
interview Officer Lucas that he wanted to know what 
the nature of the complaint was, but you didn't 
volunteer it? 
A Yes, I said that. 
Q And it was only until he insisted that he 
wouldn't answer questions that you finally told him 
it was excessive force? 
A Yes. 
Q That's a violation of policy; isn't it? 
A I guess it would have been, had the 
investigation continued at that point. But since he 
wanted it, I gave it to him. 
Q So, he didn't get any written 
notification of what it was about, and you told him 
it was excessive force during the investigation? 
Having known that Officer Snow said the gun was out 
prior to taking his statement, when Officer Lucas 
said, "It was in my holster," did you confront him 
with that? 
A I asked him four or five times, yes, to 
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1 clarify that, just so I could get it straight, 
2 Q Did you say, "Well, Officer Snow said the 
3 gun was out"? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Why not? 
6 A I don't tell burglars I have witnesses, 
7 either. 
8 Q So, you had already concluded that he had 
9 violated the law? 
10 A No, that isn't what I said. You asked me 
11 why I didn't tell him. I'm telling you, when you're 
12 interviewing someone, you don't tell them everything 
13 you have. 
14 Q You don't tell an officer that another 
15 officer saw him with his gun out when he says it was 
16 in? 
17 A No. 
18 Q You don't think that might elicit memory 
19 recall? 
20 A If he's being completely honest with me, 
21 he has memory recall. 
22 Q Can people be honest and forgetful at the 
23 same time? 
24 A I think you probably forget certain 
25 facts, yes. 
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go this far. And so, it took me that long, just 
looking into things and dealing with it. 
Q In your opinion, what is the most 
important characteristic that a police officer must 
possess? 
A Honesty, I think, above all. He has to 
be trusted. He is out there, day in and day out, and 
doing things and handling the public, and everything 
that does must be -- he must be trusted. 
Q Let me refer you to Exhibit 16. It's 
your letter of termination dated August 21, '96. Had 
you reached a conclusion on August 21st, 1996 that 
you couldn't trust Officer Lucas any further? 
A That t what I wrote in th etter; that 
is correct. 
MR. HALL: I have nothing further. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BENEVENTO: 
Q Chief Killian, does your department 
follow a policy of progressive discipline? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you describe for the Commission 
what that policy is? 
A Progressive, in nature. It just has --
one thing goes -- you give a day off -- you give a 
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written reprimand, a verbal reprimand, then you go 
into days off, and then I go into termination. 
Q And depending -- I'm sorry, go ahead. 
A So, that is the progression The 
progression can be done on a verbal reprimand by my 
sergeants, by my lieutenants; it doesn't have to be 
done by me. 
Q And also, to be fair to you, Chief, if an 
incident's of such an egregious nature, you don't 
have to go through each of those steps; do you? You 
can go to suspension or you can go to termination 
without going through oral reprimand or written 
reprimand, etc; right? 
A That's correct. 
Q Had Officer Lucas in his 12 years ever 
been reprimanded orally or verbally on dishonesty? 
A Not by me. 
Q Had Officer Lucas ever been suspended for 
dishonesty? 
A Not by me. 
Q Whenwas t he complaint for excess i w e 
force resolved? 
A When was that resolved? r don't think 
that has been resolved. In my mind, I think that is 
still sitting up there. It's just something that was 
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MR. SMITH: I was going to ask the same 
question. 
MR. FERGUSON: Just a couple questions. 
When you first arrested the suspects anc were out 
in the field, did you believe at that time that they 
had -- one of them had a weapon? Did you believe 
that Spegar had a weapon? 
THE WITNESS: No, I didn't. 
MR FERGUSON: Did you pat down his 
crotch area at that time? 
THE WITNESS: I did not. 
MR. FERGUSON: Why not? 
THE WITNESS: I've got two men in 
custody, you know. And if I were to do that, then 
I'd have to give my undivided attention to this guy. 
If he clamped l e g s , m y 11 •  \ i ci s trapped and 
the other one turns around, they can beat the crap 
out of me. 
MR. FERGUSON: I think you said you'd got 
them both handcuffed. 
THE WITNESS: That's right. 
MR. FERGUSON: Why didn't you pat them 
down? 
THE WITNESS: As I said, it's the methods 
that we're taught. You know, just because someone is 
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in handcuffs doesr mean that they can't hurt you. 
It's an officer safety thing. 
MR. FERGUSON: I'm confused here. I 
don't mean to cut you off, but you said you reached 
into his pocket and grabbed onto something that was a 
hard object. Why is that different than patting down 
his crotch? 
THE WITNESS: It's not something that I 
normally do, pat down someone's crotch, unless I have 
a specific reason to do so. In a cursory search, 
when it's raining and it's dark, I'm just going to do 
a quick pat down for my safety, handcuff him, and 
take him in an office where it's lit and it's dry and 
I can do a better job. It's common practice here. 
And it's something we have been doing for years. And 
I think it needs to be understood that I've done this 
hundreds of times. And I've taken hundreds of 
weapons off of serious suspects. 
MR. FERGUSON: What's confusing to me as 
a layperson is why, if you thought he had a weapon, 
why you would let him put his hands anywhere near 
where the weapon might be, if you already had the 
opportunity with him being handcuffed to make sure he 
didn't have a weapon. 
THE WITNE S S : It's just \i it i ""i"« » J 
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practice for me check a guy's crotch unless I have 
a reason. Now, I knew he had tools with him. I've 
arrested a number of vehicle burglars before, they 
always have tools in their pockets. So, maybe I was 
a little complacent in assuming it was merely tools, 
which it was. But when he went for his crotch, for 
reasons unbeknownst to me, I had to react. And I 
just feel that he was beckoning a reaction from me. 
MR. FERGUSON: Did you believe at that 
time, then, that he was going for a weapon? 
THE WITNESS: I did. 
MR. FERGUSON: Did you ever tell Chief 
Killian that? 
THE WITNESS: I told him that he went for 
his crotch. 
Ml ERGUSON: Did you ever tell anybody 
during any of these interviews that you thought he 
was going for a weapon at that time? 
THE WITNESS: I believe that I 
articulated myself quite specifically as to why. 
MR. FERGUSON: That he was going for a 
weapon? 
THE WITNESS: Sure. In i»' c P nt times, 
we've arrested people that are stashing 25-caliber 
automatics in their crotch, so they were aware of the 
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danger in the situation and my concern. It wasn't 
something that I had to articulate with them. 
MR. FERGUSON: So, if he was going for a 
weapon, how were you trained to react to that if you 
believe he's actually going for a lethal weapon? 
THE WITNESS: Just as I did: Verbally, 
physically, and going for my weapon. And I think the 
thing that brought it to a halt is an immediate 
compliance to what I told him. I pushed him and 
said, "Put your hands on the wall," and he couldn't 
get there fast enough. Aiid he held perfectly still, 
which put an end to it. 
Now, had it continued, yes, would have 
escalated. I would have physically had to take 
control of him or drop him. If I felt that wasn't 
possible, then I would have had to pull my weapon and 
decide whether to use it or not. And I think 
everyone has to realize, this is made -- this 
decision is a split second. But being that he did 
comply, further action was not necessary. 
MR. FERGUSON: Anything further? 
THE CHAIRMAN: Don't take this down. I'm 
sti concerned about the hard object in n. 
Did you ever find out what it was or where it was? 
THE WITNESS: It was a pair of pliers 
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